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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2-
2(3)0), U.CA. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The fundamental problem with the Statement of the Issues presented for review in 
the Brief ("City's Brief) filed by Respondent /Appellant Bluff dale City ("City") and, 
indeed, the fundamental problem with the City's entire appeal, is that except for a few 
technical legal issues which are, rightfully, the province of this Court to decide, the 
majority of the City's arguments were decided at trial in favor of Petitioner/Appellees 
("Landowners"). This case will not be factually retried by this Court on this appeal. The 
City has utterly failed to honestly marshal the voluminous evidence supporting the 
Landowners' victory and has, badly, misstated or even ignored the proper standard of 
appellate review. The City would have this Court believe that the District Court's 
Findings of Fact and Memorandum Decision ("Memorandum Decision") was apparently 
pulled out of thin air with no evidentiary support at all in the record of a four day trial. 
The Landowners take exception1 to certain Issues Presented for Review the by the 
City, specifically Issues: 
II. A. (correctness of the District Court's determination that the Landowners 
invocation of the disconnection statues was not precluded by the statutes allowing 
municipalities to adjust their common boundaries); 
1
 Landowners do not take exception to the City's proper statement of Issue I and the 
unnumbered introductory portion of Issue II. 
l 
II. B. (correctness of the District Court's finding that the disconnected property did 
not create a peninsula); 
III. (correctness of the District's Court's "Justice and Equity" determination); and, 
IV. (allegedly erroneous factual findings). 
For ease of the Court in cross-referencing this dispute, the Landowners will track 
the numbering of the Issues as used in the City's Brief. Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1), Utah 
R. App. P., the Landowners articulate the disputed issues presented to this Court for 
review as follows: 
II. A. Non-preemption of Disconnection Statute. Whether the District Court was 
correct in determining that the § 10-2-419, U.C.A., which allows municipalities to adjust 
their common boundaries, does not preclude landowners from invoking their rights to 
disconnect from a municipality pursuant to § 10-2-501, et seq., U.CA. The appellate 
court reviews a District Court's statutory interpretation for correctness, according the trial 
court no deference. Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004, UT 59, K 13, 96 P. 3d 
893. 
II. B. Island or Peninsula. Whether the District Court properly found that neither 
an island nor a peninsula were created in violation of § 10-2-502.7(3)(iii), U.C.A. This is 
a mixed question of law and fact2. On the legal issue the standard of review is correction 
of error. Groberg v. Hous. Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT APP. 67, f 10, 68 P.3d 1015. On 
2
 The City's articulation of this issue suggests that the existence or creation of a peninsula 
is purely a legal question when, in fact, by its very nature, it is highly factually intensive. 
The District Court's Memorandum Decision is, on this issue, based almost entirely on 
detailed facts in the Record. 
2 
the factual issues in ruling on a petition for disconnection, the District Court's findings of 
fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Disconnection of 
Territory from the City of Draper. 646 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1982) (citing Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. City of Bingham Can von. 18 Utah 2d 60,415 P.2d 209 (1966)). A party 
challenging a factual finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding. Rule 24(a)(9) Utah R. App. If the evidence supporting any 
challenged finding is inadequately marshaled, as done by the City here, the reviewing 
court assumes all findings are adequately supported by the evidence. Chen v. Stewart. 
2004 UT 82,1 19, 100 P.3d 1177. Further, neither a mixed question of law and fact nor 
the City's attempt to characterize such as a question of law relieves the City of the 
marshalling rule. United Park Mines v. Stichting. 2006 UT 35, <fl 25 (citing Chen). The 
City's failure to marshal is inexcusable and fatal. 
III. Justice and Equity. Whether the District Court erred in its "justice and equity" 
analysis where it thoroughly considered the totality of the City's dysfunctional processes, 
lack of municipal services and delays as well as all of the other statutorily mandated 
* As will be shown ad nauseum more fully below, the City's efforts at marshaling the 
evidence regarding the factual issues on which the City appeals (Issues II.B., Ill and IV) 
can only be described as risible and in transparent bad faith. The City's Brief selectively 
misquotes what little supporting evidence from the Landowners' case at trial that it 
deigns to present to this Court and ignores voluminous evidence, including even that of 
its own witnesses and exhibits, supporting the Landowners' victory. The reason for this 
failure by the City to marshal the evidence supporting the District Court's factual 
decisions is obvious: any honest marshaling would conclusively establish that the City 
could not have appealed these fact-based issues in good faith. Due to this failure by the 
City, the Landowners have had to spend considerable time, effort and money responding 
to these factual issues (indeed, approximately one-half of this Brief) and should be 
compensated for those damages pursuant to Rule 33(a), Utah R. App. P. 
3 
factors. Whether the general standard of "justice and equity" has been met in a particular 
case turns in large measure on the facts. The District Court's findings of fact will not be 
disturbed unless clearly erroneous. In re Disconnection of Territory from the City of 
Draper, 646 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1982). A party challenging a factual finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. 
App. P. If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, as done by the City here, the 
reviewing court assumes all findings are adequately supported by the evidence. Id at 
701-702; Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 19 100 P.3d 1177. 
IV. Factual Findings. Whether the District Court's findings regarding the 
viability of the disconnection and its impact on the City were supported by the evidence. 
The District Court's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly 
erroneous. In re Disconnection of Territory from the City of Draper, 646 P.2d 699, 701-
702 (Utah 1982). A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence 
that supports the challenged finding. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App. P. If the evidence is 
inadequately marshaled, as done by the City here, the reviewing court assumes all 
findings are adequately supported by the evidence. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 19, 
100 P.3d 1177. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statutory provisions are found in § 10-2-501, U.C.A., et seq; 
specifically, § 10-2-502.5, U.C.A., which provides for the invocation of the District 
Court's jurisdiction after a municipality has denied a petition for disconnection and § 10-
2-502.7, U.C.A., which details the analysis a District Court must make at trial in 
4 
determining whether to enter a decree of disconnection. The definition of a "peninsula" 
is found in §10-1-104(6), U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Introduction 
The Landowners disagree with the Statement of the Case as presented by the City. 
The City's Statement of the Case attempts to argue its position by misconstruing what 
this case is about and, in doing so, is even more one-sided and contentious than is 
customary, appropriate or permissible in this setting. The City's Statement of the Case 
also includes numerous irrelevant references such as which parties are paying the 
Landowners' attorneys' fees. Further, as more specifically detailed in the Statement of 
Facts, the City's Statement of the Case includes blatant falsehoods without any support in 
the record such as the claims that the Landowners "could have received municipal 
services by remaining in Bluff dale" (when the Record is replete with proof that the City 
has been willfully incapable of providing such services) and that "Herriman has indicated 
it will allow [the Landowners to develop at higher densities]" (where the Record is utterly 
devoid of any evidence supporting such a statement). Finally, as more fully noted below, 
the City's Statement of the Case ignores the fact that the City has an obligation to 
honestly "marshal the evidence" regarding those factual findings it disagrees with. 
The City's Brief would have this Court believe that this entire action is only a 
financially-motivated effort by one (or at most two) landowners to leave the City because 
of that landowners dissatisfaction with a single land use decision by an innocent, well-
managed, thoughtful City. Nothing could be further from the truth. As the District Court 
5 
found, and the evidence in the Record fully supports, the City is a dysfunctional and 
delusional mess, treats all landowners unfairly and has neither plans nor abilities to 
provide basic development infrastructure or services to the Disconnection Property. This 
is, as the Landowners have consistently argued, a factual situation akin to that which 
drove the Founders of the United States to declare independence from England - only in 
this case the methodology adopted by the Landowners for disconnection was prescribed 
by statute requiring only protracted litigation, not war. 
The Statement of Facts presented below by the Landowners is drawn, 
substantially, from that which was presented to the District Court in the Landowner's 
Trial Brief. That is because all of the Landowners' Statements of Fact were, in fact, 
proven at trial. Virtually none of the City's facts proffered in its Trial Brief or, for that 
matter, in its Brief to this Court, were established at trial. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1), Utah R. App. P., the Landowners submit the following: 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the decision of the District Court, pursuant to § 10-2-502.7, 
U.C.A., granting a Petition to the District Court for disconnection of the Landowners' 
properties from the City. 
B, Course of Proceedings 
Pursuant to § 10-2-501, U.C.A., fifty-two owners of land in the City representing 
3,131 acres of land (and 79% of the area proposed for disconnection) petitioned the City 
to allow their land and a few other properties (collectively, the "Disconnection Property") 
to be disconnected from the municipal boundaries of the City. The City denied those 
petitions.5 
Two of the land-owning entities which petitioned the City for disconnection then 
filed this action (the "Petition") in the District Court pursuant to § 10-2-502.5, U.CA. 
Those two owners represented 1,770 acres (44.5% of the Disconnection Property). The 
City moved to dismiss raising several arguments. The City claimed that the Petition was 
barred because one of the owners should have appealed an earlier zoning decision under 
the former § 10-9-1001, U.CA., and, further, that the provisions allowing municipalities 
to adjust their common boundaries under § 10-9-419, U.CA., was the exclusive remedy if 
the lands proposed for disconnection adjoined another municipality. The District Court 
denied these motions. 
The City also claimed that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because all of the "the landowners" who "petitioned" the City had not also been named as 
"Petitioners" in the Petition to the District Court. The District Court determined that the 
Petition to the District Court needed to include as "Petitioners" owners of 51% of the 
Disconnection Property who had also been "petitioners" to the City. The District Court 
granted leave to file an Amended Petition curing this issue. An Amended Petition was 
promptly filed by 38 of the petitioners to the City representing 72% of the Disconnection 
4
 The City stipulated that these petitions complied with §10-2-501, U.C.A., including 
notice to all affected landowners and other governmental entities. R. 1166, f 2. 
5
 The same petitioners simultaneously asked the City and Herriman to consider adjusting 
their common boundary pursuant to §10-2-419, U.C.A., R. 1176, ^ 44. Neither Herriman 
nor the City acted on these petitions. R. 1176, f 44. The petitioners also simultaneously 
asked Herriman to annex the Disconnection Property after the disconnection. Id. 
Herriman has never acted on that aspect of the petitions. Id. 
7 
Property.6 
The City sought leave to file an interlocutory appeal on this jurisdictional issue. 
The Court of Appeals declined that invitation. 
Based on the City Attorney's public advice to the City that it would lose this 
disconnection suit, the City and the Landowners entered into a proposed Consent 
Decree. In part because of issues raised by persons8 who attempted, unsuccessfully, to 
intervene at the last minute, the District Court declined to enter the Consent Decree. 
C. Disposition in the District Court 
After a four-day bench trial and extended consideration of the entire Record 9 the 
District Court entered the Memorandum Decision with findings and reasons as required 
by § 10-2-502.7(5), U.C.A., and, thereafter, a Decree of Disconnection. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Disconnection Property is approximately 3,971 acres. R. 1166. All of the 
Disconnection Property is contiguous, bare, vacant10 land situated southwest of the 
6
 No person owning land in the Disconnection Area, including the current Mayor of 
Bluff dale who, as a part of post-trial proceedings claimed to have owned land inside the 
Disconnection Property, has ever objected to the disconnection by way of admissible 
evidence. R. 1180,172. 
7
 Petitioners' Exhibit 207, p. 3. 
8
 These late intervenors included one person who was, shortly thereafter, elected to the 
City Council on the platform of preventing any meaningful development of the 
Disconnection Property and with the financial support of the person who was later 
elected to be Mayor on a similar platform. 
9
 To speed up the presentation to the District Court virtually all of the Exhibits proposed 
by the City and the Landowners were admitted en masse. Also, virtually all of the 
depositions were published en masse. The District Court considered both the Exhibits 
and the depositions in making its Memorandum Decision including those that were not 
specifically addressed at trial. 
8 
Welby-Jacob Canal (the "Canal") except for a tiny portion of the Disconnection Property 
that lies between the Canal and Redwood Road (aka Camp Williams Road) which was 
included in the disconnection petition because it makes for a logical resulting boundary. 
The Canal runs in a general northwesterly direction from about the southeasterly corner 
of the City where the Canal intersects Redwood Road. R. 1166-1167, 1177; Ex. 210, 
R.1295,p. 10,11. 10-25, p. 11,11. 1-6, p. 12,11. 1-4. 
2. The Disconnection Property was not considered by the founders11 of the City 
(those individuals who initiated the incorporation of the City and who served on its first 
City Council) to be a part of "historic" Bluff dale. R. 1295, p. 289-292. 
3. The Disconnection Property is bordered on three sides, as, essentially, a right-
triangle, by municipalities lawfully incorporated under the laws of the State of Utah.12 R. 
1295, p. 61. 
4. The unincorporated area which will exist after the Disconnection Property is 
disconnected will not be surrounded on one-half of its boundary by incorporated territory. 
Shortly before trial the City claimed the there was one home within the Disconnection 
Property. Testimony from that homeowner was disallowed by the District Court and the 
City did not appeal that ruling. There is no dispute that this property was, like all others 
properly noticed for all statutorily required proceedings. 
11
 This testimony came from a witness, Quinn Barton, who was listed on the City's "Will 
Call" list of Trial Witnesses. However, since all of Mr. Barton's testimony in his 
deposition shortly before trial favored the Landowners' position on all of the issues 
related to the disconnection the City determined not to call Mr. Barton. Instead, the 
Landowners subpoenaed Mr. Barton to be their witness at trial. See R. 1295, p. 287-313. 
The Court should note that, despite its obligation to marshal the evidence Mr. Barton 
does not even make a cameo appearance in the City's Brief. 
Because they would be distracting if fully presented here, and because of the 
complexity of the issue in light of the terribly written statute, the detailed testimony and 
argument on this issue (those portions supporting the Memorandum Decision) are 
attached as Addendum B. 
9 
R. 1295, p. 62. Further, the Disconnection Property is not so situated that a reasonable 
line drawn across it from incorporated land to incorporated land is less than 25% of the 
total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area. R. 1295, p. 62-63. 
5. On its southern side the Disconnection Property abuts Camp Williams, a 
federal military reservation which, indisputably, is not a "municipality" as that term is 
used in Chapter 2 of Title 10, U.C.A. R. 1295, p. 81. Despite disingenuous arguments in 
the City's Brief, the Record is devoid of any evidence that Camp Williams is a 
"municipality" under Utah law merely because it provides, to Utah National Guard 
personnel only, some of the same services that municipalities provide to their residents. 
There is no evidence in the Record that Camp Williams provides any services to the 
public as a municipality does. 
6. Because the area southwest of the Canal (mostly co-equal to the Disconnection 
Property) could not reasonably be serviced by Bluff dale it could, according to one of the 
founders, be described as "the red-headed step-child" of Bluff dale. R. 1295, p. 309. 
(Ironically, the precise reason that Bluff dale was incorporated - to provide the services 
that Salt Lake County was unwilling and unable to do - was acknowledged in a 
deposition by one of the founders of Bluff dale to be a legitimate reason for the 
Landowners to seek disconnection from Bluffdale.) R.1295 p. 308,11. 14-25, p. 309,11. 
1-11. 
7. Other than the Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District facility there is only 
the one home which only gets garbage service from the City and no other buildings or 
structures on the Disconnection Property. R. 1166, 1177; R. 1294, p. 13,11. 3-25, p. 14, 
10 
11. 1-16. There is no utility infrastructure on the Disconnection Property other than a 12" 
water line installed by the City immediately adjacent to the Canal on the east border of 
the Disconnection Property. R. 1166-1167. 
8. Testimony at trial, including from the City's own engineer, established that this 
12" line was installed primarily to serve existing City residences on the east side of the 
Canal in the currently-developed portion of the City. R. 1179, f 64; R. 1296, pp. 77-78, 
139. The 12" water line is insufficient, both in size and in hydraulic head, to service 
much of the Disconnection Property. R. 1167, f 8; R. 1296, p. 50. That the 12" water 
line was not intended to service the Disconnection Property was also shown because the 
City never consulted with the owner of the land about its sizing or location and never 
made any attempt to charge the Disconnection Property for any of the costs of the 12" 
Water line. R. 116718; R. 1296, pp. 132-139. 
9. Not only is there no City infrastructure in place to service the Disconnection 
Property, evidence at trial established that as of the filing of the petitions for 
disconnection with the City the City had no substantive plans for providing or financing 
necessary infrastructure, except for the plans that were done by South Farm as a part of 
the development applications that the City rejected. R. 1166-1167, 1177; R. 1283, p. 36. 
The City had begun a number of plans exploring the provision of such services but, 
explicable only by the City's dysfunctionality and incompetence, over the course of 
13
 This is yet another area where the City's Brief fails in its marshaling requirements. 
The testimony in the Record in support of the Landowners' claim and the District Court's 
finding on this issue is voluminous and unequivocal. But not even a pebble of that 
mountain of evidence in the City's Brief is found within the City's Brief. 
U 
several years had been unable to finish even one. R. 1167-1177; R. 1295, pp. 23-30; R. 
1283, pp. 46, 114, 150, 213; R. 1283, p. 34-38, 44-45, 48, 50, 52, 60, 61, 63. 
10. There are no public roads, accesses, or bridges crossing the Canal to provide 
public access to the Disconnection Property. R. 1167; R. 1283, pp. 28, 36. Except for 
the transportation plans that were done by South Farm as a part of the development 
applications that the City rejected, as of the filing of the petitions for disconnection with 
the City, the City had no substantive plans for providing or financing the necessary 
transportation improvements. R. 1169, f 20-21; R. 1283, p. 99-101. 
11. No substantial municipal services are provided by the City to the 
Disconnection Property. R. 1166-67. The City provides the limited police (through a 
contract with the Salt Lake County Sheriff) and fire protection necessary for the 
occasional brush fire and possible trespasser on the vacant land that is the Disconnection 
Property. R. 1167,^9. 
12. The Disconnection Property, as vacant land, is held largely under the green belt 
tax assessment program and generates a total annual real property tax assessment of 
$1,753.00 to the City. R. 1177, f53; R. 1296, pp.10-11; R. 1283, p. 98. Other than this 
pittance, the City receives no revenue from the Disconnection Property. Concomitantly, 
The City's claim in 161 of its Statements of Facts, that it had completed various 
infrastructure plans before the filing of the disconnection petitions, is simply false. The 
testimony at trial cited above established that the City had been unable to complete any 
infrastructure planning at all and had adopted, in over a decade prior to this action, not a 
single plan to provide infrastructure to the Disconnection Property. Of course, keeping 
with its pattern of evading its marshaling duty, the City fails to acknowledge to the Court 
the undisputed testimony on this issue. 
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because the Disconnection Property is vacant land the City provides virtually no 
municipal services. R. 1177,154; R. 1296, pp.11-16; Ex. 130. 
13. Many of the owners of the Disconnection Property have held their lands for 
decades while other owners have acquired their properties over the last few years. The 
land is mostly unsuitable for agriculture as being dry and rocky. R. 1295, p. 12,11. 15-23. 
All of the owners desire to develop their properties and, to do so, require a responsible 
and reasonable local government willing to and capable of providing services and 
infrastructure to the land. R. 1283, p. 199,14-12. 
14. The City has repeatedly shown, both through its actions and its inactions, that 
it is incapable of being such a responsible partner and unwilling to become so. R. 1167-
1177; R. 1295, pp. 23-30; R. 1283, pp. 46, 114, 150, 213; R. 1283, pP. 34-38, 44-45, 48, 
50,52,60,61,63. 
15. The City's Brief (Statement of Facts <H 39-53 and 56-59) attempts to cast this 
entire case as simply one developer's attempt at getting revenge on the City for the denial 
of a re-zoning application - an application that was, by the way, consistent with 
agreements between South Farm and the City and was recommended for approval by the 
City's consultants and professional staff. R. 1295, p. 29, K 1-9. But that is not the case. 
In fact, the testimony established that the disconnection was triggered by the City's 
stunning levels of incompetence, inability to make up its mind and unwillingness to make 
any plans to provide public services and infrastructure to the Disconnection Property. R. 
1167-1177; R. 1295, pp. 23-30; R. 1283, pp. 46, 114, 150, 213; R. 1283, pp. 34-38,44-
45,48,50,52,60,61,63. 
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16. The City's existing plan for the Disconnection Property is for the land to be 
developed for, at the most intense, single family residential homes on lots of at least 1 
acre in size. R. 1283, p. 78,11. 5-16. There is no reasonable way for the Disconnection 
Property to be developed at this ultra-low density. R. 1295, pp. 30-31. Development and 
sale of such a huge number of 1-acre lots would involve a time frame beyond rational 
planning. R.1295, pp. 336-338. Further, such a development would be economically 
unfeasible both for the landowners and the City. R. 1295 pp. 336-338. No competent 
evidence was offered at trial by the City to establish that the City's vision is anything 
other than a delusion. R. 1192; R. 1295, p. 338. Evidence offered by the Landowners 
demonstrated, on the contrary, that such a desire by the City is unreasonable and even 
ridiculous. R. 1295, p. 30-31. 
17. South Farm, one of the Landowners, purchased 1,125 acres in the City between 
1983 and 2005. R. 1167-68; R. 1283, p. 31. Between 1993 and 2001, South Farm began 
to meet with City officials concerning development of its property.15 R. 1169-1177; R. 
1283, pp. 33-90. South Farm held at least 12 meetings with two different mayors and 
held other meetings with City officials and Salt Lake County officials. R. 1169-1177; R. 
1283, pp. 33-90. Site evaluation and analysis began in 1996 and concerted planning 
The City claims that the actually processing time for the South Farm application was 
relatively short. (City's Brief, Statement of Facts, p. 5, f 3-4.) That claim by the City 
ignores the testimony at trial about delays caused by the City prior to a formal 
application. R. 1283, pp. 62-67 (cited in the body of this paragraph). 
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efforts to develop South Farm's property in the City began in May of 1998. R. 1169-
1177;R. 1283, pp. 33-90. 
18. In November of 2001, the City, without the permission of South Farm, 
trespassed on South Farm's property to construct the 12" water line discussed above. R. 
1171, % 29. R. 1283 p 51-52. The primary purpose of the waterline was to provide fire 
protection for new homes being built east of the canal (i.e., not properties that are a part 
of the Disconnection Property). R. 1171,P0;R. 1296, pp. 138-139. 
19. As a resolution of this trespass, South Farm agreed to allow the construction 
without requiring condemnation and without receiving any compensation from the City 
for the easement. R. 1171, ^[31. In turn, the City adopted Resolution No. 2002-05 on 
January 8, 2002. R. 1172, f 33; R. 1283. pp. 52-53. The Resolution committed the City 
to allow South Farm to develop its land in a manner that was compatible with the 
development of other property owned by South Farm, referred to as South Farm, in 
Herriman, an adjacent city. R. 1172-73, ^33; R. 1283, pp. 61-62. The Resolution also 
committed the City to work in a speedy and timely fashion to review the development 
application of South Farm. R. 1283, p. 59,11. 15-24. Furthermore, the City committed to 
work with the applicable service districts to bring the necessary infrastructure to the 
property to ensure timely and orderly development of the property. 
16
 The City claims that South Farm's plans were contrary to the City's Master Plan. 
(City's Brief, Statement of Facts, p. 5. f 3-4.) That claim by the City ignores the 
testimony at trial explaining that the proposed development was consistent with changes 
that the City told South Farm it wanted to make in the master plan regarding development 
in "Planning Area 4" (which describes almost exactly the same land as the Disconnection 
Property) known as the Quality Growth Plan. R. 1283, p. 47; R. 1295, pp. 17-18. 
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20. As a part of the City's consideration of Resolution No. 2002-05 the City 
Council was repeatedly warned by the then City Attorney not to vote for the Resolution if 
they didn't intend to honor it and allow South Farms to develop its property in 
conformity with the Resolution. 17The Bluff dale City Council Meeting Minutes note: 
Mr. Curtis advised the Council not to vote for this if the only 
thing they are going to support at this site is one-acre lots. 
Mr. Curtis stated that if the City doesn't provide 
infrastructure for development, landowners make a very 
compelling argument to disconnect. 
* * * 
Mr. Curtis advised the Council that if they are not 
comfortable with the mixed-use development out in 
Herriman, not to vote for this resolution. 
Claudia Anderson asked if the Council doesn't approve this 
resolution, would the developer take the land and go 
elsewhere. Mr. Curtis stated that it would be fair to say that 
one of their options would be to attempt disconnection. 
R. 1171-72,132; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 134, pp.7 and 8. 
21. On May 6, 2002, South Farm filed an application for a General Plan 
Amendment and Zone Change for its property.18 R. 1173, 136; R. 1283, pp. 68-69. Six 
months passed with no action by the City on South Farm's Application. R. 1173, <P6; R. 
1175,139; R 1283, pp. 70-71. During that time South Farm suggested to the City that the 
processing of the review of its plan should be outsourced because of the City's limited 
17
 The City Council Member who moved for the adoption of Resolution No. 2002-05 is 
now the Mayor of the City who, as noted earlier, ran on a platform of killing the 
development of this property. 
18
 The City claims (Statement of Facts, p. 12,140 - 45) that South Farm's applications 
after Resolution No. 2002-05 were not compliant with the Master Plan ignoring the fact 
that the applications were consistent with the City's Quality Growth Plan and with 
Resolution No. 2002-05. 
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resources. R. 1175, f40; R. 1283, p. 71,11. 9-20. It took approximately 8 months to 
complete the outsourcing including negotiating the Scope of Work (the City originally 
wanted South Farm to pay for re-planning the entire City) and hiring the consultant. R. 
1283, p. 71-73. During that process, and without acting on South Farm's application and 
ignoring South Farm's and other property owner's objections, the City changed the 
existing General Plan and created a new designation for all of the Property as "Planning 
Area No. 4". R. 1175-76,141-42. Six more months went by without any action by the 
City on South Farm's Application. R. 1283, p. 73. 
22. On April 22, 2003, South Farm provided funds to the City for the outsourcing 
of the application to be reviewed by an outside consultant team known as JUB/Tischler. 
R. 1283, p. 73,11. 14-22. That review was completed on July 3, 2003. R. 1283, p. 75,11. 
7-9. From July 3, 2003, to October 7, 2003, the City completely ignored South Farm's 
application and the recommendation of its outsourced consultants while the City's staff 
created its own plan for South Farm's property. R. 1283, pp. 82-83. On October 7, 2003, 
the Planning Commission approved the plan created by the City's staff and ignored the 
South Farm application. R. 1175; R. 1283, p. 86,11. 18-22. 
23. On December 4, 2003, the City's consultants, JUB/Tischler, reported to the 
City that South Farm had met the City's criteria for developing its property. Despite that 
positive recommendation by its own planning experts and staff the City rejected South 
Farm's General Plan Application and request for Zone Change on December 9, 2003.19 
19
 The City's Brief (Statement of Facts, p. 5. Statement of Fact 15) tries to make 
headlines about South Farm's decision not to appeal this denial. The fact is that this 
17 
24. During the 19 months that South Farm had worked with the City, through 30 
meetings with the City Staff, 25 Planning Commission meetings and 30 City Council 
meetings seven different alternate proposals were submitted by South Farm to the City to 
address the concerns of the City. R 1295, p. 30,11. 14-19. All this was done at a cost to 
South Farm in excess of $950,000.00 to obtain approval of a General Plan Amendment 
and Zone Change, which was not granted. R. 1295, p. 30,11. 14-19. During this 19 month 
period the City had 3 different City Planners and 3 different City Attorneys. R. 1283, pp. 
86-87. 
25. The other landowners, seeing the frustrations of South Farm and having their 
own bad experiences with the City, decided that they did not need to bash their heads into 
the City's brick wall just to see how bad a headache they could give themselves. R. 
1176,143; R. 1295, pp. 158-159; R. 1295 p. 210,11. 16-25. 
26. For example, at trial, David Millheim, representing Development Associates, 
testified extensively about his prior involvement with the City's dysfunctional processes 
as did another landowner, Mr. Tracy Burnham. R. 1295, pp.174-75. That testimony 
included descriptions of the City flouting its own rules and state law and of the City 
Court has all-but-guaranteed the futility of such an appeal. In Bradley v. Payson City, 
2003 UT 16, 70 P.3d 47, and other cases, this Court has held that property rights 
described as "sacred" in the Constitutional Convention and as "unfettered" in common 
law are, instead merely "entitlements" granted at the whim of elected governments with 
no role for the courts in determining the appropriateness of those decisions except for 
"takings" and "vested rights". 
18 
refusing to comply with regulations such as those for affordable housing without being 
forced to do so as a result of litigation. 
27. The other landowners were also aware of the City's continuing inability to 
provide infrastructure to their lands. R. 1176,143; R.1295, p. 211,11. 12-25, p. 212,11. 1-
4. 
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28. Based on this history, several owners of land that was a part of the 
Disconnection Property, on February 12, 2004, filed petitions with the City for either a 
boundary adjustment with Herriman pursuant to §10-2-419, f/.CA.,22 or to disconnect the 
Disconnection Property from Bluffdale pursuant to §10-2-501, f/.C.A.23 R. 1203, p. 987. 
The same petitions also sought to annex the Disconnection Property into Herriman 
pursuant to §10-2-403, U.C.A. R. 1176,144; R. 1283, pp. 87-88. 
29. The City declined to approve the boundary adjustment24 or to allow the 
voluntary disconnection on May 11, 2004. R. 1176, f44; R 1283, p. 88,11. 8-11. 
It should now go without saying that this testimony which unequivocally supports the 
District Court's Memorandum Decision is AWOL from the City's Brief in violation of 
the marshaling requirements. 
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The City's Brief (Statement of Facts p. 5-6, f 7 and 8) pretends that it was only one or 
two big developers who filed these petitions. That is false. Fifty-two landowners, both 
large and small filed; virtually all of the private landowners in the Disconnected Property. 
The properties that did not sign were mostly either controlled by an out-of-state bank as 
trustee for an estate, publicly owned, or owned by the LDS Church which, generally, tries 
to avoid taking positions on political disputes. 
22
 Section 10-9-419, U.C.A., does not provide any private right for landowners to seek or 
force a boundary adjustment. The rights and processes of § 419 are within the exclusive 
authority and discretion of the two effected municipalities. 
23
 The City has stipulated to the compliance with the technical requirements of §10-2-
501, U.C.A., regarding notifications and other technical aspects. 
24
 Because of Bluffdale's refusal to approve the boundary adjustment the Petitioners did 
not actively pursue this option with Herriman. 
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30. Two of the owners who had petitioned the City then filed this litigation 
pursuant to §10-2-502.5, U.C.A. R. 1283, p. 88. 
31. The City moved to dismiss the Petition to the District Court arguing that the 
parties filing the Petition had to own more than 50% of the property proposed for 
disconnection (or, in the logical extension of that argument, that the "Petitioners" to the 
District Court had to be the exact same and entire class of "petitioners" to the City). R. 
132-145. 
32. The District Court agreed that the parties named as "Petitioners" in the 
Petition to the District Court had to own more than 50% of the Disconnection Property 
but allowed the filing of an Amended Petition to meet that threshold. R. 160-162. 
33. The City attempted to appeal the District Court's jurisdictional ruling to the 
Court of Appeals but the Court of Appeals rejected this interlocutory effort. R. 203-205. 
34. An Amended Petition was then promptly filed naming as Petitioners owners of 
far more than 50% of the Disconnection Properties. R. 1295, pp. 42-44; R. 163-180. 
35. The City also sought to dismiss this case based on claims that the 
disconnection created a "peninsula" or an "island". R. 45-55; R. 161. The Court denied 
this Motion noting the size of the proposed disconnection and the fact that the 
Disconnection Property would be annexed into Herriman. R. 45-55; R. 161. The Court 
further ruled that the creation or existence, vel non, of a peninsula was an issue of fact. 
R. 45-55; R. 161. 
36. The Court granted the Landowners' motion dismissing several of the City's 
defenses all of which claimed, in essence, that this litigation was merely a "land use" case 
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in disguise and thus should be governed by then-applicable provisions for resolving such 
disputes then found in §10-9-1001 f/.C.A, (now found in §10-9a-801, U.C.A.). R. 160-
161. 
37. While discovery on this litigation was in progress the City approached the 
Landowners to see if the parties could agree to a responsible development of the 
Disconnection Property in the City and thus moot the litigation. R. 1283, pp. 88-89; R. 
1295, p. 162. 
38. The parties negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") over 
several months which all of the City's professional staff (including the City Attorney, 
Administrator, Planner and Engineer) recommended. R. 1283, p. 990. The MOU 
provided certain development parameters similar to those in Resolution 2002-05 and 
contemplated the rapid negotiation of a detailed development agreement which would 
clarify, detail and implement these parameters. R. 1283, pp. 90-91. The City Council 
twice rejected the MOU. R. 1176; R. 1283, pp.89-93; Petitioners' Exhibit 191. 
39. Discovery recommenced. One of the City Council members who had voted 
against the MOU, Jesse Kelly, then admitted in his deposition that the City had treated 
South Farm unfairly in denying South Farm's application and thus that "justice and 
equity" should allow the disconnection. R. 1295, pp. 87-89. 
40. Based on this admission the City Council reconsidered the MOU and adopted 
a slightly modified MOU on June 1, 2005. R. 1296, pp. 202-204. 
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41. Citizens of Bluff dale tried to force a referendum on the MOU itself but the 
City determined that it was not referable and the citizens did not appeal that decision. 
Petitioners' Exhibit 121. 
42. Based on the MOU, the parties negotiated intensely for several months over 
the terms of a development plan for the Disconnection Property to be implemented by a 
development agreement. R. 1283, pp. 89-90. This negotiation involved a master 
committee including the engineers, planners, counsel and senior business persons of the 
large property owners. R. 1295, pp. 163-165. On the City's side the negotiators included 
the Mayor, two members of the City Council and all of the relevant City staff including 
the City Attorney, Administrator, Planner and Engineer. Literally hundreds of hours and 
tens of thousands of dollars were spent by the parties to try to create a reasonable plan for 
developing the Disconnection Property in the City. R. 1295, pp. 163-165; Petitioners' 
Exhibit 248, pp. 4-5; R 1295, pp. 58-59. 
43. A part of that effort involved the City creating an "enabling ordinance" as a 
part of its zoning code to allow for large, master-planed projects. R. 1283, p. 91. These 
enabling acts are common practice along the Wasatch Front, indeed in the entire Untied 
States, for large developments. Petitioners' Exhibit 207; R. 1283, pp. 91-92. 
44. The City adopted its Special Development Plan ordinance on August 23, 2005. 
A citizens group known as "Bluffdale United" obtained, partly through the use of 
statements that they later admitted to be untrue, enough signatures on a referendum 
petition to force a referendum. R. 1176-77, f 48; Petitioners' Exhibit 126 (Bluffdale 
United Website Binder). R. 1283, pp. 92-93. 
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45. Based on the fact that the referendum on the SDP ordinance (and not on the 
outcome of the referendum as the City now implies) would, in the words of the City 
Attorney, make it "likely that the property would be disconnected from Bluff dale and 
annexed into Heniman," the parties agreed to try to reword their settlement to be in the 
nature of a "Consent Decree" and sought the Court's entry of that Consent Decree.26 R. 
1177,149; Petitioners' Exhibit 207. 
46. In addition to trying to force yet another referendum on the Consent Decree, 
Bluffdale United (with the support, encouragement and participation of two persons who 
were later elected as members of the City Council and the new Mayor) attempted to 
intervene in this litigation and asked the Court to reject the Consent Decree. R. 298-302. 
47. The Court declined to enter the Consent Decree as an Order of the Court and 
set this matter for trial after the completion of discovery.27 R. 1177,151. 
The referendum issue was complicated by this Court's decision in Mouty v. Sandy 
City, 2005 UT 41, which held, contrary to long-established practice, that even single-
property rezonings were referable and, further, that pending the vote potentially long-
away on a referendum any development actions were essentially pointless as not 
conferring any vested rights. 
26
 It is true, as the City argues, that development of the Disconnection Property pursuant 
to the Consent Decree would have conveyed significant benefits on the City. (City's 
Brief, Statement of Facts p. 16. f 68.) However, the loss of those benefits due to the 
District Court's refusal to approve the Consent Decree is not tantamount to a finding that 
the disconnection would harm the City in any of the ways cognizable by the District 
Court pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(i) [the disconnection leaving a remnant part of the 
City which would have increased servicing costs] or (ii) [making it unfeasible for the City 
to continue to exist as a municipality]. The mere fact that the City has chosen to look the 
proverbial gift horse in the mouth is not the fault of the party offering to give the horse to 
the City. 
27
 The City's Brief claims, in its Statement of Fact 154, that this suit would not have gone 
to trial except for the referendum. That is purely speculation. There is no way to know 
whether the District Court would have approved the Consent Decree whether there was a 
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48. At trial the Landowners called a number of witnesses on all of the statutory 
elements for disconnection. Despite its duty to marshal the evidence supporting the 
District Court's factual determinations the City's Brief completely fails to summarize this 
testimony or, worse, to even hint at its existence.28 
&• Don Wallace, an experienced developer for South Farm, testified to 
the frustrating course of development in the City (R. 1283, pp. 46, 100, 114, 150, 213) 
the City's inability to provide services (R. 1283, pp. 28, 36,45, 71-77, 95-96, 100, 149, 
154, 172, 178, 213, 219, 238, 251, 277), the viability of the disconnection and its 
negligible impact on the City (R. 1283, pp. 94, 100, 155, 249). Mike Bradshaw, South 
Farm engineer, testified to the same issues and also that the disconnection would not 
create a peninsula. R. 1295, pp. 60-63. 
b. Dave Millheim, an experienced developer and former City Manager 
for South Jordan, testified to the same incompetence of the City, the City's inability to 
service the Disconnection Property, the viability of the disconnection and its negligible 
impact on the City. R. 1295, pp. 160, 176, 200. Tracy Burnham, an owner of a smaller 
portion of the Disconnection Property also testified to the problems in the City. R. 1295, 
pp. 210-211. 
referendum or not. Further, even if there had been no referendum on the master planning 
enabling act, and if the parties had executed a development agreement and a rezoning of 
the Disconnection Property, each of those actions may have been subject to a referendum 
too which would have led to this case going to trial. 
28
 See Addendum A for a more detailed summary of this testimony and the other relevant 
testimony supporting the District Court's Memorandum Decision. 
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c. Karen Wikstrom, an eminently qualified local government finance 
expert, testified that the disconnection was viable29 (both as vacant land in Salt Lake 
County and if incorporated into Herriman) and that the impacts of disconnection on the 
City would be minimal.30 R. 1295, pp. 318-331; R. 1296, pp. 10-35 Dave Goeres, a 
licensed professional traffic engineer, testified about the minimal impacts on the City of 
the disconnection as did Rod Mills, a licensed civil engineer.31 R. 1295, pp. 276, 225-
244. 
49. After the conclusion of the trial and a detailed review of the evidence in the record 
the District Court, pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(5), f/.C.A., entered its Memorandum 
Decision on February 21, 2006. R 1165-1198. 
50. The key findings by the District Court regarding those issues objected to by the 
City are as follows: 
a. The District Court had jurisdiction. R. 1166, f 2. 
b. The disconnection is viable. R. 1183-1184. 
Ironically the City's Brief claims that there was not sufficient evidence to support the 
District Court's determination about the viability of the disconnection. However, when 
the Landowners' counsel attempted to adduce such testimony at trial from Ms. Wikstrom 
the City's counsel objected that it was "cumulative" because Messrs. Wallace, Millheim 
and Bradshaw had already testified to the same opinion. The City's Brief failed to 
acknowledge this fact to the Court and this is, perhaps, the most egregious example, 
among literally scores of other similar failures, of the City's failure to meet its duty to 
marshal the evidence. 
The City attempted to have an expert witness support its case but the District Court 
granted a Motion in Limine precluding such testimony because the witness was 
unqualified and his incomprehensible testimony would be a waste of time. The City did 
not appeal that ruling. R. 1296, p. 160-162. 
31
 The City's Brief wrongly, albeit not surprisingly, utterly ignores the testimony and 
exhibits of these witnesses. 
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c. "Justice and Equity" favored disconnection. R. 1184-1188. 
d. Disconnection would not leave Bluffdale with an area within its borders 
for which the cost of providing municipal services would materially 
increase. R. 1188-1190. 
e. Disconnection would not make it unfeasible for Bluffdale to function as 
a municipality. R. 1190-1191. 
f. Disconnection would not create an island or peninsula. R. 1191- 1195. 
g. Salt Lake County was capable of providing cost-effective municipal 
services to the disconnected parcel. R. 1195. 
h. This action is not an appeal of a zoning decision, R. 1196. 
i. This action is not a boundary adjustment action. R. 196-1197. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The City raises three basic arguments: (1) the District Court lacked jurisdiction; 
(2) the Landowners' invocation of the disconnection statute contravened § 10-2-510, 
U.C.A., and § 10-9-1001, U.C.A., et seq.\ and, (3) the District Court made erroneous 
factual findings, including that: (a) the disconnection property was not a peninsula in 
violation of the statute32; (b) the "justice and equity" standards weighed against the 
disconnection; (c) the disconnection was viable; and, (d) the City's costs for providing 
municipal services would not increase. 
32
 The City argues the District Court's determination that the Disconnected Property was 
not a peninsula was solely a question of law. Whether the Disconnected Property was a 
peninsula is, obviously as the District Court found and the City's Brief spends several 
pages proving, a mixed question of law and fact. 
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1) Jurisdiction. In order to attack the jurisdiction of the District Court, the 
City relies on Howard v. Town of North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216 (1955), 
which clearly is distinguishable. The first steps to disconnect from a municipality under 
the relevant statute in Howard were to file a petition in the district court and for the 
district court to then cause notice of the filing to be served upon the municipality and 
published. Additionally, the district court needed to find, at the hearing on petition, that 
the petition was signed initially by the required majority, that the allegations in the 
petition were true and that justice and equity required the disconnection. Finally, the 
district court was to appoint commissioners to determine the terms of disconnection. 
The first steps under the current statute which governed the petition (to the City)/ 
Petition (to the District Court), are completely different. Now, disconnection first 
requires filing a petition with the municipality which is then subject to significant notice 
and public hearing requirements designed to insure that everyone who could possibly 
have any interest in the disconnection is aware of its potential and has the opportunity to 
comment before the municipality's legislative body. 
The Howard court found the petition for disconnection filed in District Court was 
insufficient because it was not signed by the requisite number the landowners on the day 
that it was filed with the District Court and that such inadequacy was not curable by 
adding additional petitioners on the day of trial. The reasoning of the Howard court, 
which the City ignores, was that by failing to properly notify the citizenry of the 
disconnection proceeding, interested parties would not have had the opportunity to 
object. In the present case, the citizenry of the City were more than adequately notified 
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of the pending disconnection proceeding thus satisfying the reasoning in Howard. 
Further, nothing in Howard or § 10-2-502.7, U.C.A., precluded the District Court 
from considering the Amended Petition as being essentially a "Petition" - the only 
difference being that the Clerk did not get a second filing fee. Also, the City's Brief 
misinterprets § 10-2-502.7, U.C.A., as to who are "petitioners" to the City versus who are 
"Petitioners" to the District Court. 
2) Preemption of the Statutory Right to Disconnect. The City asserts that the 
Landowners efforts to disconnect from the City are precluded by § 10-2-510, U.C.A., 
which prevents municipalities, but not landowners, from using the disconnection process 
to circumvent the boundary adjustment procedures of § 10-9-419, U.C.A. By reading 
this statute together with the disconnection and boundary line statutes as a whole, it is 
clear that municipalities are precluded, but not the Landowners, from combining the 
disconnection/annexation statutes to ultimately achieve a boundary line adjustment. 
The City maintains that because one of the Landowners could have appealed a 
land use decision related to its property pursuant to then-applicable § 10-9-1001, U.C.A., 
(currently § 10-9a-805, U.C.A.), that all of the Landowners should therefore be precluded 
from bringing the disconnection action. In essence, the City wants the Landowners to be 
forced to employ only the legal theory of the City's selection. It is axiomatic that a party 
may chose to prosecute an action under a legal theory of its choosing. The City cites to 
no law supporting its position which is contrary to common sense and logic. 
3) Factual Issues. Concerning the factual issues, the City has completely 
failed to marshal the evidence and ignored the standard of review which grants very high 
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deference to the District Court's factual findings. The most definitive and recent case 
regarding the marshalling requirement is Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, <H 76-80, 100 
P.3d 1177. This Court held in Chen that a failure to marshal on factual issues would 
result in the District Court's factual determinations being sustained. Hence, the total 
failure by the City to satisfy its obligations to marshal the evidence supporting the 
District Court's factual finding must result in the District Court's findings of fact being 
affirmed. As shown in the Statement of Facts, supra, the Landowners provided a 
mountain of testimony and evidence in the Record33 supporting the District Court's 
findings regarding "justice and equity", "viability" and all of the other factual findings 
challenged by the City.34 
Regarding the District Court's determination that a peninsula was not created by 
the disconnection, the City's failure to marshal the evidence is, again, fatal to the City's 
arguments. The peninsula issue is a mixed question of law and fact. First, the District 
Court must interpret the relevant statute, § 10-1-104(6), U.C. A Second, the District 
Court must apply that interpretation of the law to the facts in the case at bar. A mixed 
question of law and fact does not relieve the City of the marshalling rule. United Park 
* Despite the unequivocal holding in Chen it would be a perilous gamble by the 
Landowners' counsel to have abjured in this Brief from marshaling the evidence 
supporting the District Court's factual findings. The City's placing the Landowners' 
counsel in such a position supports a finding that this appeal was in bad faith on these 
factual issues justifying an award of damages under Rule 33, Utah R. App. P. 
34
 On the issue of viability the City didn't offer a single witness to contradict the 
witnesses and evidence adduced by the Landowners. On the issue of whether the 
disconnection would leave the City with any area of increased costs the barely 
comprehensible testimony offered by the City was vastly outweighed by the testimony of 
the Landowners' witnesses, especially under the marshaling and deference standards 
applicable to this appeal. 
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Mines v. Stichting, 2006 UT 35, <j[ 25 (citing Chen). 
The statutory definition of a peninsula is in two parts. First, pursuant to § 10-1-
104(6), U.C.A.: "when used to describe an unincorporated area, [peninsula] means an 
area surrounded on more than one half of its boundary distance, but not completely, by 
incorporated territory . . . . " The District Court made a factual finding that the 
Disconnection Property was not so situated and that finding is supported in the Record. 
Second, and only if the first test is met, a peninsula exists or is created if "the 
length of a line drawn across the unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an 
incorporated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of the total aggregate 
boundaries of the unincorporated area." The District Court adopted the factual 
calculations of the Landowners' engineer who determined that there was no peninsula 
created by the disconnection. 
The District Court also found that because the statutory language was unclear, the 
lines suggested by the statute could be drawn in almost every case both proving and 
disproving the creation or existence of a peninsula. The District Court's determination 
that the property configurations resulting from the disconnection did not meet the 
historical rational behind prohibitive peninsulas was also supported in the Record. 
Finally, as shown in the Landowner's Statement of Facts below, the District Court's 
determinations regarding viability of the disconnection and its negligible impact on the 
City were amply supported by the evidence. Only the City's repeated and willful failure 
to marshal the evidence even half-disguises the correctness of this decision. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION 
The City argues that the District Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction 
because the original Petition to the District Court did not name as "Petitioners" owners of 
more than 50% of the Disconnection Property. (Remember, it is undisputed that the 
earlier petitions to the City did have far in excess of the requisite 50% support). In 
support of its argument, the City relies almost entirely on Howard v. Town of North Salt 
Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216 (1955). Howard is easily distinguishable from this 
case because the jurisdictional aspects of the disconnection statute that was applied in 
Howard bear no resemblance to the jurisdictional aspects of the current disconnection 
statute (i.e., citation of Howard by the City is an anachronism giving evidence of the 
City's utter confusion regarding the whole disconnection process or its desire to prevail 
through obfuscation).35 Additionally, the reasoning of Howard fully supports the District 
The City's reference to Howard as addressing "the failure to file a disconnection 
petition by those specified in the disconnection statute" [City's Brief p. 25] is curious 
when in fact the only petition that is filed under the current statute in the District Court is 
a petition "challenging the municipal legislative body's determination [regarding a 
request for petition]." Under a now extinct iteration of the disconnection statute, 
petitioners would actually file a petition with a district court asking the court to 
disconnect the property (as opposed to challenging the municipality's decision not to 
disconnect). The City tries to use Howard to read into the current statute language that 
existed in the version of the disconnection statute applied in Howard but conspicuously 
absent from the current version ("The act of obtaining a majority of property owners' 
signatures on the petition is a condition precedent to the right of a court to make a 
disconnection." [City's Brief at 26 citing to Howard]). That language does not exist in 
the current statute and to the extent that it was a jurisdictional requirement under the 
version applied in Howard it was because, as the City has acknowledged, it was imposed 
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Court's decision here. 
Unlike the current disconnection statue (discussed below), the first step required 
by the disconnection statute in Howard was the filing of a petition by a majority of 
property owners of the area proposed for disconnection directly in the District Court. In 
Howard, that initial petition to the District Court was not signed by a majority of the 
effected landowners. Id at 217. On the very day the case was finally called for hearing, 
fifteen unverified motions for leave to intervene as landowners were filed. Id Over the 
Town's objection, the District Court counted the interveners and determined that the 
majority requirement was met. Id 
This Court held that the District Court never acquired jurisdiction. Id at 220. It 
reasoned: 
Not alone are the Petitioners and city or town interested in 
any contemplated disconnection, but all of the other owners 
of property within the corporate limits of the city or town are 
concerned. Although they are not required to be made parties 
. . . the [district] court must cause notice of the filing or the 
petition to be published . . . in some newspaper . . . . The only 
apparent reason for such a publication is to notify the other 
property owners that a move is afoot to disconnect part of the 
city . . . . By examining the petition on file the remaining 
owners would be advised who is seeking to divide the town 
and would be in a position to know what countermeasures 
may be taken to preserve it intact. This they may not know if 
the court allows interveners to add their names to those of the 
petitioner on the very day the case comes for hearing by the 
[District] Court. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) 
as one of the "requisites fixed by the legislature" as opposed to a requirement urged by 
the municipality or created by the court. 
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Even if the City is correct in contending that a majority of the owners of the 
Disconnection Property were required to join in the Petition, the failure to have done so is 
not a jurisdictional issue. In the instant case, the current statutory framework of the 
disconnection statute satisfies the Howard court's concerns about the intervention of the 
necessary parties on the date of trial. The first step of the current disconnection statue 
requires a request for disconnection explicitly identifying owners of 50% of the real 
property proposed for disconnection to be filed with the city's legislative body. § 10-2-
501, U.CA. This was done here. 
The current disconnection statute requires that then notice be published for three 
consecutive weeks in a newspaper and mailed to each of the property owners within the 
area proposed for disconnection as well as to the County. Id. All of this was done. 
Any resident of the City could examine the petition and "be advised who is 
seeking to divide the town and would be in a position to know what countermeasures 
may be taken to preserve it intact." Any resident of the City could go on to "speak and 
submit documents regarding the disconnection proposal" at a hearing before the City's 
legislative body. Within 45 days of the City's statutorily mandated hearing any resident 
of the City would be informed as to whether the disconnection was allowed. 
Only after all of this process and notice could the Landowners file a petition with 
the District Court. §§10-2-501, U.CA. and 10-2-502.5, U.CA. Not one single owner of 
the disconnection property has ever objected to the disconnection. R. 1180,172. 
Here, the District Court allowed the Landowners to amend the Petition so as to 
meet the 50% ownership requirement that the District Court believed to be required by § 
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10-2-502.5, U.C.A. The Amended Petition was signed by 35 of the 52 landowners who 
had executed the petition submitted to the City.36 Pursuant to Rule 15, U.R.C.P., the City 
had exactly the same amount of time to respond to the Amended Petition as it did to the 
original Petition. 
It follows that any citizen of the City had the opportunity to review both the 
original Petition and the Amended Petition, determine who was seeking to divide the City 
and know what countermeasures should be taken. Obviously, that citizen could have 
previously learned this same information by reviewing the petition submitted to the 
City's legislative body and publicly noticed. Not only would the citizen have the 
knowledge, he or she could engage any countermeasures at the hearing before the City's 
legislative body. Hence, the concerns of the Howard court have been more than 
satisfied.37 
In further support of its argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction, the 
City also cites Mariemont Corp. v. White City Water Improvement Dist, 958 P.2d 222 
(Utah 1998). Mariemont essentially followed the reasoning of Howard and will therefore 
be distinguished in short order. 
The Howard court noted that, "It can not be inferred that the Legislature intended that 
other real property owners who had never signed the petition . . . could by legal device of 
a motion to intervene be intended by the Legislature as signers of the petition." Id. at 
220. (Emphasis partially in original.) In the present case, all of the landowners who were 
parties to the Amended Petition before the District Court also signed the petition 
submitted to the City. 
on 
' The practical impact of a reversal on this issue would just be that the Landowners 
would file another petition with the City which would be denied and the parties would be 
back in District Court. All of the time and effort of the District Court and the parties 
would just have wasted to produce the same eventual outcome. 
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Mariemont dealt with withdrawal from a special improvement district rather than 
disconnection from a municipality. In Mariemont the special improvement district 
sought to invalidate the petition for disconnection, after it was filed, by introducing forms 
executed by property owners who requested that their names be removed from the 
withdrawal petition. Id at 223. The Mariemont court held that the sufficiency of the 
petitions for withdrawal should be judged as of the date of filing and that no amendments 
to the petition should be permitted thereafter. Id. at 226. 
As in Howard (and unlike this case), the operative statute in Mariemont required a 
petition for withdrawal to be filed first in District Court. Id. at 224.38 Because the 
Mariemont court provided no independent reasoning for its holding, one can safely 
assume it is based on the reasoning employed by the Howard court. As discussed in 
detail above, the concerns noted in this reasoning were more than adequately addressed in 
the present case because procedural changes implemented by the current disconnection 
statute (and fully satisfied by the Landowners) provided ample notification to the 
citizenry. 
The last case cited by the City in support of its contention that the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction is South Jordan City v. Sandy City, 234 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 870 P.2d 
273 (Utah 1994). In that case, South Jordan City filed a petition in district court pursuant 
to the disconnection statute in effect at that time to disconnect parcel of land located in 
Sandy City. Id at 273. The disconnection statute in effect at that time was similar to the 
i n 
The Mariemont court noted that the statutes for disconnection from a municipality and 
from a special district were "virtually identical." Id. at 226. 
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statutes applied in Howard and in Mariemont in that the initial step was the filing of a 
petition in district court as opposed to a request for disconnection with the municipality's 
legislative body. 
At that time the disconnection statute required, inter alia, a majority of registered 
voters to sign a petition to disconnect. Id. at 274. No registered voters resided in the 
disconnection property. Id. Because the petition was not signed by registered voters it 
was facially defective and this Court held that, therefore the District Court properly 
dismissed it. Id. at 275. 
Although the Landowners prevailed on the issue of jurisdiction before the District 
Court, they do not accept the District Court's interpretation of § 10-2-502.5, U.C.A., as 
requiring a majority of the owners of land, who were also petitioners to the City, to have 
filed the Petition in District Court. The misguided nature of the City's approach to 
attacking the District Court's jurisdiction underscores the District Court's incorrect 
interpretation of § 10-2-502.5, U.C.A. The District Court's interpretation of § 10-2-
502.5, f/.C.A., has only fueled the City's attempts to anachronically characterize the 
Petition to a District Court in a disconnection proceeding as a legislative or quasi-
legislative process. 
In applying its incorrect interpretation, the District Court read into the statutory 
requirement a definite article that definitely does not exist in the statute: "So when the 
statute says . . . that the petition against the municipality may be brought by the 
petitioners . . .." See City's Brief p.7, % 16. The term "petitioners" in § 502.5 is not 
preceded by any article, let alone the definite article "the". 
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Even replacing the term "petitioners" with the definition ascribed to it in § 501(1), 
does not lead to the interpretation adopted by the District Court. The definition of 
"petitioners" refers only to "persons" (not all persons or the persons) who own property 
in the area proposed to be disconnected and who have signed a request for disconnection 
with respect to that area. As such, the term "petitioners" does not, by grammatical 
definition, refer to all persons who are properly seeking to disconnect their land from a 
municipality, but refers instead, to more than one such petitioner who, logically and 
grammatically, may or may not constitute all such petitioners. 
The interpretation of the term "petitioners" to be an indefinite plural number of the 
Landowners is consistent with the usage of the term in the disconnection statute. Section 
10-2-50l(2)(a), U.C.A., requires a request for disconnection to be filed by "[petitioners" 
with a municipality's legislative body. That requirement could not require the logistical 
nightmare of requiring all petitioners to appear at the municipality's legislative body 
simultaneously (or even consecutively) to file the request for disconnection. Such a 
requirement would be particularly impractical given that the requirements for a request 
for annexation include signatures of "the owners" of more than 50% of the real property 
in the disconnection area and the designation of "between one and five persons with 
authority to act on the petitioners' behalf in the proceedings." § 10-2-50l(b)(i) and 
(b)(iv), U.CA. The designation of "between" one and five persons means that those who 
are authorized to act on behalf of "the petitioners" to the City will consist of two, three or 
four persons (i.e., consistent with the terminology of the statute, at least two "petitioners" 
will always be acting under the statute and, hence, the singular of the term, petitioner, has 
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no function in the statute—as such the consistent use of the plural term throughout the 
statute should not be read automatically to refer to all of the petitioners). 
The District Court's interpretation would also make the few times the legislature 
actually uses the definite article with the term "petitioners" meaningless in violation of 
canons of statutory construction. When a municipality distributes notice under § 10-2-
502.5(2), U.C.A., it must send that notice in writing to "the petitioners"—not an 
undefined subset thereof consisting of at least two petitioners (that number being the 
minimum number of representatives to be appointed to act for the petitioners). 
A reading of §§ 10-2-502.7 and 509, U.C.A., (the remaining incidents of the term 
"petitioners" in the disconnection statute) reveals that the term "petitioners" is also not 
preceded by the definite article in these sections. The lack of a definite article is 
consistent with the purpose of these sections which is to impose obligations and burdens 
on those petitioners who have actually represented all of the petitioners and/or filed the 
petition before the District Court (as opposed to all 52 petitioners who signed the petition 
to the City). A Petitioner to the District Court who desires to challenge the 
municipality's decision does so at the risk of bearing the costs to be imposed on 
"Petitioners" if that Petitioner is successful. 
The District Court's interpretation of § 10-2-502.5, U.C.A., has imposed on 
disconnection proceedings duplicative and onerous procedural requirements that were 
never contemplated by Howard, (allegedly the City's "foursquare" precedent), 
Mariemont or South Jordan City and are certainly not imposed by the plain language of 
the disconnection statute. The District Court's interpretation requires, first, the 
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concurrence of the majority of the owners of land in the disconnection area in order to 
initiate the disconnection process, and then, months later, the concurrence of those same 
owners who must still own a majority of the land in the disconnection area. 
Application of the District Court's interpretation of the term "Petitioners" as it 
relates to who has to be a party to the disconnection litigation in District Court creates a 
logistical quagmire that the drafters of the disconnection statute clearly attempted to 
avoid. That interpretation would require all 52 of the Landowners, constituting all of the 
petitioners to the City for purposes of § 10-2-501(b), U.C.A., to act in concert and hand-
in-hand in all respects, including with respect to publication, mailing and delivery of 
notice. It would make the designation of representatives for "the petitioners" superfluous 
since no action could be taken without all of the other petitioners in any event (e.g. there 
is no apparent function for the petitioners' representatives other than to execute the 
actions required to be taken by petitioners under the statute). 
The District Court's interpretation also creates a temporal dilemma. What if a 
petitioner to the City had sold all of the petitioner's land in the area proposed for 
disconnection, had died or had otherwise become legally incompetent. The District 
Court's interpretation, taken to its logical extreme, creates a form of lottery where a 
municipality opposing disconnection bets on enough petitioners, or any single petitioner, 
selling their property, dying or becoming legally incompetent, so that the municipality 
remains intact by default because not enough "petitioners" to the City remain to sign a 
"Petition" to the District Court challenging the municipality's decision. While 
Landowners succeeded in avoiding this nightmare (in part because of the overwhelming 
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support for disconnection by owners of land in the Disconnection Property), the District 
Court's interpretation runs the risk of eviscerating the right for judicial review of a 
municipality's rejection of a disconnection request. 
The District Court's interpretation also requires that Petitioners not only act in 
concert with respect to deciding whether to disconnect from a municipality, but also 
whether to accept the terms of such disconnection. If the City had determined to grant 
the petition but had sought to impose terms relating to the disconnection that were 
onerous with respect to a particular petitioner to the City (or small group of petitioners), 
then, without the signatures of several petitioners who may not have cared about the 
imposition of such terms, the burdened petitioners would not have had the right to appeal 
those terms. 
The interpretation suggested by Landowners herein also avoids, as stated above, 
the temptation to treat what is now entirely a judicial process (albeit employing the 
judiciary's equitable powers) as the quasi-legislative process that existed under the old 
disconnection statute. The City argues that the District Court does not have the ability to 
grant leave to amend a Petition before it, in part, because the delegation of "legislative" 
authority to a district court in the old version of the disconnection statute was 
circumscribed by strict adherence to the allegedly jurisdictional requirements set forth in 
the statute. The City's arguments are anachronistic at best and misleading at worst for 
the following reasons. 
First, the Howard court found that the old version of the disconnection statute 
actually conditioned the jurisdiction of the district court on the district court making 
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specific findings, including that a majority of the landowners in the proposed area to be 
disconnected had signed the petition before the district court. Under the current statute, 
the Legislature has delegated its authority with respect to disconnections to each 
municipality's legislative body subject to a district court's review of that decision on the 
basis of viability, justice and equity and financial and geographic considerations. 
Currently, the process before a district court is not intended to be the quasi-legislative 
process that occurred under the old version of the disconnection statute, the legislative 
efforts having been made before the municipality's legislative body through public 
hearings and comment. Under the old version of the disconnection statute, the 
amendment of a disconnection petition effectively invalidated any notice that had been 
ordered by a district court. Here, the District Court's granting of leave to file the 
Amended Petition here had absolutely no impact on the legislative record at all. 
Furthermore, the current disconnection statute does not prescribe any time limit 
within which a Petition by the District Court challenging a municipality's decision must 
be filed. The City has never alleged such a time limit and does not identify any time limit 
in the City's Brief. Without any express time limit on when the Petition disputing the 
City's decision was to have been filed in District Court and no prejudice to the parties to 
the action or their legal position, there was no harm. As such the District Court's use of 
the Amended Petition as a mechanism to cure its perception of a defect not impacting 
jurisdiction and having the exact same effect as the filing of a new Petition with all of the 
same parties, should not be grounds for reversal by this Court. 
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II. THE LANDOWNERS INVOCATION OF THE 
DISCONNECTION STATUE WAS NOT PRECLUDED 
BY § 10-2-419, U.C.A. OR §10-9-1001, U.C.A. 
A. Section 10-2-419, U.C.A.* by its own terms, applies only to municipalities and not 
private landowners. 
The City argues that § 10-2-419, U.C.A., is the only method by which the 
Landowners can move the Disconnection Property to Herriman. Section 10-2-419, 
U.C.A., by its own terms, applies only to municipalities and not to private landowners. 
The City cites § 10-2-510, U.C.A., which states: "This part shall not be constructed to 
abrogate, modify, or replace the boundary adjustment procedure provided in Section 10-
2-419." 
However, § 10-2-419, U.C.A., contains no provisions by which private landowners 
may adjust the boundary line between two municipalities. Only contiguous municipal 
entities, not landowners, may adjust boundary lines pursuant to this statute. It necessarily 
follows that the Legislature meant to only preclude contiguous municipalities from 
utilizing § 10-2-510, U.CA., " . . . to abrogate, modify, or replace the boundary 
adjustment procedure provided in Section 10-2-419." 
For example, in South Jordan, supra, South Jordan City sought to utilize the 
disconnection statute to disconnect a parcel of land from Sandy City, a neighboring 
municipality. If South Jordan City attempted to do so today it clearly would be precluded 
by the § 10-2-510, U.C.A.39 
39
 The date of South Jordan also puts paid to the City's argument that § 510 was intended 
to prohibit private landowners from resorting to disconnection. Section 510 was added in 
1997 only three years after two cities had gotten into a disconnection fight but 6 years 
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B. The existence of rights to appeal land use decisions does not preclude disconnection. 
The City contends that the Landowners should be precluded from employing the 
disconnection statute, § 10-2-501, U.C.A., et seq., because the decision complained of by 
the Landowners is the City's denial of South Farm's application for general plan 
amendment and zone change. Thus, according to the City the District Court erroneously 
allowed the Landowners to circumvent the Municipal Land Use, Development, and 
Management Act. City's Brief, p. 37-38. 
First, the City's argument on this point is a deliberate conflation of two completely 
separate statutory schemes. While it is true that the City's decision denying South 
Farm's development application may have been the final temporal antecedent to the 
Landowners petitioning for disconnection it was not the sole casus belli any more that 
was the imposition of a tax on tea by the British Crown the sole reason for the 
Revolutionary War. The Landowners established at trial a long history, a veritable Bill of 
Particulars, of oppression and willful incompetence on behalf of the City in dealing with 
the Landowners and others as well as a complete inability of the City to plan for or 
provide services and infrastructure to the Disconnection Property. That history, not one 
single back-breaking tea bag of it, gave rise to this action. 
The City provides no case law in support of its strained preemption argument. 
This issue should be resolved in the Landowners favor for one simple reason: the 
disconnection statute and the statue concerning appeal of a land use decision are two 
before the current iteration of the disconnection statute was created specifying the process 
for private landowners to disconnect. The Landowners could not find any legislative 
history that was related to this question. 
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separate and mutually exclusive statutes. 
The District Court, in its Memorandum Decision, correctly stated that the statutory 
provisions concerning municipal land use decisions and the disconnection from a 
municipality are separate and distinct. R. 1196. The District Court further noted, "It is a 
rare circumstance that a landowner affected by a planning and zoning decision could 
meet all the tests required for a disconnection simply because the landowner was 
unhappy with a zoning decision." IdL According to the District Court the City's argument 
lacked merit. Id The City's argument on this issue has not been enhanced, modified or 
supported on appeal to this Court. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS 
WERE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
In ruling on a petition for disconnection, the District Court's findings of fact will 
not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. In re Disconnection of Territory from the City 
of Draper, 646 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1982) (citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. City of 
Bingham Canyon, 18 Utah 2d 60, 415 P.2d 209 (1966). A party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding, Utah 
R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(9). If the evidence is inadequately marshaled the reviewing court 
assumes all findings are adequately supported by the evidence. Chen v. Stewart 2004 
UT 82,^(19, 100 P.3d 1177. 
This Court held in Chen that a failure to marshal the evidence on factual issues 
would result in the District Court's factual determinations being sustained. Specifically, 
this Court stated: 
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In order to challenge a court's factual findings, "an appellant must 
first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate 
that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when 
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." [ ] Where a trial 
court's rulings on highly fact-dependent issues are challenged, this court 
grants broader than normal discretion to the trial court. [ ] As a result, 
where the legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the appellant has the 
duty to marshal the evidence. [ ] This duty requires an appellant to "marshal 
all the evidence in favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then 
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact." 
[T]he Utah Court of Appeals explained that "in order to 
properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists." [ ] This does not mean that the party may simply provide an 
exhaustive review of all evidence presented at trial. [ ] Rather, appellants 
must provide a precisely focused summary of all the evidence supporting 
the findings they challenge. [ ] This summary must correlate all particular 
items of evidence with the challenged findings and then convince us that 
the trial court erred in the assessment of that evidence to its findings. [ ] 
What appellants cannot do is merely re-argue the factual case they 
presented in the trial court. [ ] 
The process of marshaling is thus fundamentally different from that 
of presenting the evidence at trial. The challenging party must "temporarily 
remove its own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position"; he 
or she must play the "devil's advocate." [ ] In so doing, appellants must 
present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court, [ ], and not 
attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case. [ ] 
Appellants cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts from 
the record in support of their position. [ ] Nor can they simply restate or 
review evidence that points to an alternate finding or a finding contrary to 
the trial court's finding of fact. [ ] Furthermore, appellants cannot shift the 
burden of marshaling by falsely claiming that there is no evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings. [ ] This would inappropriately force an 
appellee to marshal the evidence in order to refute an appellant's assertion 
of the absence of evidence. Id. In sum, to properly marshal the evidence the 
challenging party must demonstrate how the court found the facts from the 
evidence and then explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of 
the evidence. [ ] 
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The purpose of this rigorous and strict requirement is to promote two 
interrelated court objectives: efficiency and fairness. [ ] A proper 
marshaling of the evidence promotes efficiency by avoiding "retrying the 
facts" and by assisting the appellate court in its "decision-making and 
opinion writing." [ ] It promotes fairness by requiring that the appellants 
bear the expense and time of marshaling the evidence rather than putting 
the appellee in the "precarious position" of performing the appellant's work 
at "considerable time and expense." [ ] This deference to a trial court's 
findings is "based on and fosters the principle that appellants rather than 
appellees bear the greater burden on appeal. [ ] 
If the marshaling requirement is not met, the appellate court has grounds to 
affirm the court's findings on that basis alone. [ ] If appellants have failed 
to properly marshal the evidence, we assume that the evidence supports the 
trial court's findings. [ ] 
Id. (Emphasis added, citations omitted.) Further, a mixed question of law and fact 
does not relieve the City of the marshaling rule. United Park Mines v. Stichting, 
2006 UT 35,125 (citing Chen). 
Despite the failure of the City to marshal the evidence the Landowners respond as 
follows: 
A. The District Court was correct in determining that the disconnection did not create an 
island or peninsula. 
The peninsula issue is a mixed question of law and fact. First, the District Court 
must interpret the relevant statute, § 10-2-104(6), U.CA.. Second, the District Court 
must apply the facts to its interpretation of the law. 
Section 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii), U.CA., provides that the Landowners must prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed disconnection will not "leave or create 
one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory." While the term 
"peninsula" is defined by statute, the term "island" is not. 
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"Island" is defined as, "a land mass not as large as a continent, surrounded by 
water . . . [or] anything like an island in position or isolation." Webster's New World 
Dictionary of the American Language, 747, (2nd College ed. 1978). As the exhibit 
included in the Addendum to the City's Brief (and in Addendum B) demonstrates, the 
Disconnection Property is not an island because Camp Williams is, indisputably, not an 
incorporated "municipality".40 
In order for a disconnected area to be considered a "peninsula" as defined in § 10-
1-104(6), U.C.A., both parts of a two-part test must be met: 
"Peninsula," when used to describe an unincorporated area, 
means [1] an area surrounded on more than Vi of its boundary 
distance, but not completely, by incorporated territory and [2] 
situated so that the length of a line drawn across the 
unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an 
incorporated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% 
of the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area. 
10-1-104(6), U.C.A. (Internal numbering and emphasis added.) 
As thoughtfully explained in its Memorandum Decision, the District Court 
employed an analysis involving both steps of the statutory test in determining that the 
Disconnection Property was not a "peninsula."41 R. 1192-95. Additionally, the District 
Presumably, if the Legislature had wanted to take Federal military reservations into 
account in deciding whether some action effecting land created a peninsula or an island it 
could have done so. It didn't. The mere fact that Camp Williams provides some 
municipalesque services, to National Guard personnel only and not to the public-at-large, 
does not make it a "municipality." 
41
 The City's Brief (pp. 29 - 35) is highly and improperly critical of the District Court on 
this issue using words such as "facetious," "nonsensical," "absurd" and "ludicrous." One 
would have wished that the City would have been more discrete; especially in light of the 
fact that the City's Brief blatantly ignores the marshaling rules and the proper standard of 
review. 
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Court found that the Disconnection Property did not fit the dictionary definition of 
peninsula nor did it meet the policy goals relating to the statutory prohibitions against 
peninsulas. R. 1194-95. 
The District Court first considered whether after the disconnection the remaining 
unincorporated area would be surrounded on more than V2 of its boundary distance by 
incorporated territory.42 R. 1192-93. In the District Court's view, because that is what 
the plain words of the statute say, all contiguous unincorporated areas must be considered 
in making the calculation of whether the disconnection property was "surrounded." Id 
Hence, the disconnected territory in this case was not a peninsula because the contiguous 
unincorporated area was "essentially infinite" as can be seen merely by looking at the 
maps in Addendum B. 
Because the Disconnection Property failed to meet first test of § 10-1-104(6), 
U.C.A., it could not be considered a "peninsula." See Parr v. Stubbs, 117 P.3d 1079,18 
(Ut. App. Ct. 2005) (use of the word "and" creates a conjunctive condition). 
Nevertheless, the District Court continued the analysis by addressing the second prong of 
the statutory test for finding a "peninsula". 
The District Court considered the "25% of the total aggregate boundaries" second 
prong and found it hopelessly vague. R. 1192. The District Court specifically noted: "In 
virtually any disconnection, it would be possible to draw a line from incorporated 
territory to incorporated territory on the opposite side that either does or does not meet 
42
 Mike Bradshaw's testimony established that the first part of the test, when applied to 
the disconnected property, indicated the Disconnection Property was not a peninsula. R. 
1295, p.62,11. 16-21. 
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the test."4' Id. Of course, here, the Landowners' witness on this issue, Mike Bradshaw, 
was clear in his calculations and explanations that the Disconnection Property did not 
create a peninsula under this second prong of the test.44 
Finally, the District Court, confronted with a dysfunctional definition of 
"peninsula" examined the historical usage of the word to try to understand what it meant. 
Ultimately, after comparing the shape of the disconnected property (which the District 
Court found to be basically a right triangle) against the dictionary definition of 
"peninsula," the District Court found that no peninsula was present in this case. R. 1195. 
The District Court also analyzed the policy reasons for prohibiting peninsulas and 
found those reasons to be lacking here. Those factual findings are amply supported in the 
Record, but the City failed to marshal any of them here. 
B. The "justice and equity" determination of the District Court is fully supported by the 
record. 
Again, the City has failed to marshal the facts and ignores the proper standard of 
review; i.e., clearly erroneous. Therefore its arguments regarding the "justice and equity" 
analysis and any other factual finding of the District Court fail. However, the Landowner 
The Landowners presented volumes of evidence and argument that show it is 
impossible to establish a bright line rule for drawing the line in the 25% test. (See 
Addendum B). If the requirement is to draw the longest line possible between two points 
on the boundary with incorporated territory, then the line will always be at least 25% of 
the boundary of the area proposed to be disconnected. If the requirement is to draw the 
shortest line possible between two points on that boundary, then the line will always be 
less than 25% of the boundary. Accordingly, the Landowners' choice of where to draw 
the line cannot be criticized for failing to follow the geometrically impossible 
prescriptions of the statute. 
44
 The City disingenuously claims that its witness, Mr. Gehring, was the only one who 
performed the relevant or necessary calculations. That willful ignorance of Mr. 
Bradshaw's testimony is more than just a failure to marshal the evidence. 
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proffers the following argument in any case: 
The District Court properly found the general standard of "justice and equity" had 
been met. This determination turns in large measure on the facts. The varied 
circumstances and facts of each disconnection case do not allow for clear-cut criteria for 
"justice and equity" analysis. In re Disconnection of Territory from the City of Draper, 
646 P.2d at 702; In re Disconnection of Territory from Layton City, 494 P.2d 948, 949 
(Utah 1972) (citations omitted); Kennecott Copper v. Bingham Canyon, 415 P.2d 209, 
211 (Utah 1966); and, In re Disconnection of Certain Territory from Highland City, 668 
P.2d 544, 546 (Utah 1983)(citations omitted). While the Legislature has set out specific 
criteria which courts must include in their analysis, no particular criteria are excluded. § 
10-2-502.7, U.CA. 
The District Court properly considered and applied all the specific factors required 
by § 10-2-502.7, U.CA., and the City has not disputed this. Confronted with the cogent 
and lucid Memorandum Decision, the City attempts to undermine the same with three 
arguments: (1) the District Court's mere consideration of potential referendums was, per 
se, erroneous; (2) the City's "delays," do not justify disconnection; and (3) raw ground 
should not be disconnected. 
First, the City argues that the District's Courts consideration of political and/or 
referendum considerations were erroneous. As an initial matter, the City refers to facts 
outside the Record, namely the outcome of a June 26, 2006 referendum. City's Brief, p. 
40. The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision on February 21, 2006. 
Obviously, the results of this referendum are not in the Record or properly before the 
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Court. Issues not raised before the trial court, including those that arose after the final 
order was entered, are not properly considered on appeal. LeBaron & Assc. v. Rebel 
Enterprises, Inc., 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 823 P.2d 479, 482-483 (Ut. App. Ct. 1991). 
The balance of the City's arguments concerning the District Court's Memorandum 
Decision's mention of referendums is easily disposed of. The City argues that never 
before has a court contemplated "political or referendum considerations." City's Brief, p. 
40. Simply because a court has not previously considered the political atmosphere in 
conducting a "justice and equity" analysis does not preclude the District Court's 
consideration of it in this case. As noted in the abundant case law cited above, "justice 
and equity" in each disconnection case turns on its own specific facts. No specific fact is 
excluded from consideration. 
The City asserts that". . . the citizens' lawful use of the referendum process 
suggests that justice and equity do not require a disconnection in the case at hand." 
City's Brief, p. 41. The District Court found that the abuse of the referendum process 
was a part of the justice and equity analysis along with the numerous other factors that 
the District Court specifically enumerated and which were all supported by evidence in 
the Record. The burden is on the City to demonstrate that the District Court committed 
error. In re Disconnection of Territory from the City of Draper, 646 P.2d at 701. This it 
has failed to do. 
The fact is, as the District Court found: 
The divisions [within the City] have escalated to the point 
that virtually any decision made by the City in favor of 
development is subject to a referendum. In the current 
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climate, it is simply not possible to negotiate with the City. 
The City's administration has in effect become an agent with 
no authority, who can say no, but can never say yes, and 
provide a reliable decision, not likely to be attacked by 
referendum. Leaving the property in the City will only 
prolong this dysfunctional and contentious process. R. 1187-
1188. 
Second, the City takes exception with the District Court's consideration of the 
City's delays in the zoning and planning process in the "justice and equity" analysis. 
City's Brief, p. 42. Again, as noted in the abundant case law cited above, each 
disconnection case turns on its own specific facts. In this case, the District Court found 
that the City's zoning and planning process was characterized by unreasonable delays and 
changing standards. R. 1184, 1186-87. The City has provided no legal support or 
reasoning why the District Court erred in considering this fact or why that determination 
was not supported in the Record. Just because the City doesn't agree with the District 
Court's factual conclusion on one part of the justice and equity analysis is not a basis for 
appeal given the marshaling requirement and the deferential standard of review. 
Finally, the City argues that "raw ground requiring municipal services should not 
be disconnected." City's Brief, p. 44. Yet, confusingly, the City immediately admits that 
the relevant case law supports the opposite conclusion. IdL Ultimately, it appears that 
the City is complaining that it is losing land "necessary for its growth." Id. The fact the 
City has lost the land in question and the income derived from its taxation does not justify 
the denial of the Petition. In re Peterson, 87 Utah 144, 154, 48 P.2d 468 (1935). 
C. The disconnection is viable 
The City has failed to marshal the evidence in regard to this argument. Hence, the 
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argument fails. However, just to end all debate, the Landowners note that several of their 
witnesses testified to the viability of the disconnection both as raw ground in the County 
and then as developed ground in Herriman after an annexation. (See Addendum A.) Not 
a single witness for the City testified to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
The City lost at trial and now attempts to throw every issue except the kitchen sink 
into this appeal. In doing so the City has broken the rules regarding the marshaling of 
evidence, ignored the standard of review, mis-cited cases and insulted the District Court. 
The District Court had jurisdiction to begin with on the filing of the Petition and 
properly allowed any technical deficiency to be corrected by the Amended Petition. The 
use of the disconnection statute by private landowners is not precluded by the boundary 
adjustment processes available solely to neighboring municipalities. The fact that one 
landowner could have appealed one land use decision does not mean that no landowner 
can ever invoke a completely separate statutory process for disconnection. 
The District Court's factual findings were correct and supported by the evidence 
that the City failed to marshal. Justice and equity demand disconnection from a 
municipality as dysfunctional, disorganized and incompetent as the City. The City had 
no rational plans for the use of the Disconnection Property and never had any plans or 
abilities to provide public services or infrastructure for the Disconnection Property. 
The Landowners met their burden at trial by way of a mountain of exhibits and a 
brigade of qualified witnesses. The City, on the other hand, proved nothing at trial for 
the simple reason that it couldn't prove anything except its own manifest injustices and 
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The decision of the District Court should be affirmed. 
i f f * 
DATED this 1 ( day of September, 2006. 
HUTCHINGS BAIRD CURTIS & ASTILL P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys for all the Landowners 
(Petitioners/Appellees) 
R. Baird 
Walter T. Keane 
HUNT & RUDD 
Attorneys for South Farm (Petitioners/Appellees) 
Hollis S. Hunt 
54 
ADDENDUM A 
ADDENDUM A 
Don Wallace (witness for the Landowners) 
Title: Vice President, Managing Member and Chief Operating Officer of South Farm, 
L.L.C. 
Education: BA in Finance, MBA and Law Degree (1994) from the University of Utah 
Work Experience: Real Estate Manager since 1994 for Sorenson Companies; currently 
manages the entire real estate portfolio of companies and properties R. 1283, p. 23,11. 
2 4 - p . 25,11. 11 
Testimony: 
• Testified about his personal knowledge of the history of the Disconnection 
Property, the various delays and dysfunction of the City in attempting to create 
and implement a land use plan for the Disconnecion Property. R. 1283, pp.27-92, 
99-101. 
• Testified about the viability of the disconnection, the cost to the County of 
disconnecting the property, the lack of services provided by the City, the 
negligible impact of the disconnection on the City and the frustrations of other 
Landowners. R. 1283, pp. 93-100. 
• Testified that the boundaries were chosen for the proposed disconnection because 
they follow the boundaries of Planning Area Number 4 and it represents the area 
where no services are provided. R. 1283, p. 27,11. 24 - p. 29,11. 14. 
• Testified that South Farm began acquired the bulk of the land in the disconnection 
area from 1983 through 1987. R. 1283, p. 30,11. 5-10; R. 1283, p. 31,11. 11-21. 
• Testified that in the same time that South Farm developed 17 subdivisions and 
about 2000 homes in Herriman (known as South Farm) not one subdivision was 
approved in the City. R. 1283, p. 31,11. 22 - p. 33,11. 1. 
• Testified that South Farm has provided a number of parks, churches, recreational 
areas, trail corridors, transportation corridors, etc. to the City of Herriman as part 
of their development. R. 1283, p. 33,11. 2-8. 
• Testified that South Farm first began development efforts in the City in 1993. R. 
1283, p. 33,11.15-p. 34,11. 12. 
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• Testified that around 1997, South Farm made efforts to start the development 
process in the City with Mayor Wanless and secured a joint meeting with the 
Planning Commission and City Council on February 27, 1997. R. 1283, p. 34,11. 
14-19. 
• Testified that at the February meeting, mayhem ensued, and people were yelling at 
South Farm representatives, including City Council members and Planning 
Commission members, and the mayor wouldn't control the meeting. He testified 
that he felt physically threatened at the meeting and hoped to get back in touch 
with the City at a later time to discuss the issues. R. 1283, p. 34,11. 6-25. 
• Testified that at the time of that February presentation, the only services to the 
property were fire and police. R. 1283, p. 36,11. 5-14. 
• Testified that at the time of the February presentation, there was no infrastructure 
on the property and no plans for any in the future. R. 1283, p. 36,11. 13-21. 
• Testified that South Farm attempted to annex county land into Riverton City, 
however the City lodged a protest against it. R. 1283, p. 36,11. 22 - p. 37,11. 18. 
• Testified that the City and Riverton had prior boundary disputes that had never 
been resolved and the City hoped to make a claim for the same land that South 
Farm was trying to annex into Riverton. R. 1283, p. 37,11. 21 - p. 38,11. 10. 
• Testified that South Farm withdrew petition to allow Riverton and the City to 
resolve their issues. The City and Riverton did not resolve their differences and 
South Farm pursued development with Salt Lake County. R. 1283, p. 38,11. 11 — 
p. 39,11. 6. 
• Testified that Salt Lake County approved the project in Salt Lake County after a 
year review. All stake holders (including the City) were invited to participate. 
Approval was accomplished in May of 1999. R. 1283, p. 38,11. 7 - p. 40,11. 13. 
• Testified that the City objected to both South Farm's development and the 
incorporation of Herriman. R. 1283, p. 41. 
• Testified that in June, Salt Lake County approved the incorporation of Herriman, 
and as South Farm approval had taken place within 30 days, it became null and 
void and they had to begin the process again with Herriman. R. 1283, p. 40,11. 
14-22. 
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• Testified that the application was filed with Herriman, and was approved in about 
60 days. R. 1283, p. 41,11. 17 - p. 42,11. 9. 
• Testified that while South Farm was working on the Herriman portion of the 
project, they continued work on the City land with the County and with the City. 
R. 1283, p. 42,11. 10-p . 43,11. 10. 
• Testified that South Farm shifted focus to the City in 2000 when the development 
agreement was finished with Herriman. Discussions began with Mayor Nelson, 
who asked South Farm to delay its application to the City because they didn't have 
the ability to serve water, had no facilities plan, and no plan to get services to the 
property. R. 1283, p. 42,11. 16 - p. 45,11. 2. 
• Testified that South Farm agreed to Mayor Nelson's request because Mayor 
Nelson told him that they were making efforts to complete planning in the area. 
R. 1283, p. 45,11. 3-12. 
• Testified that the City's planning progress was much slower than anticipated, and 
was finally completed in September of 2000 or 2001 but was not adopted by the 
City. South Farm continued to be patient and to participate in the planning 
process with the city. The resulting plan (Quality Growth Plan) was roughly 
similar to South Farm's anticipated plans for the property and South Farm 
believed that things were going in the right direction. R. 1283, p. 45,11. 5 - p. 46, 
11. 25. 
• Testified that the Quality Growth Plan contained mixed use development similar 
to that proposed by South Farm. R. 1283, p. 47,11. 8 - p. 48,11. 12; See Exhibit 
23. 
• Testified that in September of 2001, there was no schedule when adoption of the 
Quality Growth Plan was going to take place. South Farm became frustrated 
because there was no commitment as to how long the planning process would take 
when Shane Jones (the City Engineer) approached South Farm for an easement for 
a water line on the property. R. 1283, p. 48,11. 12 - p. 49,11. 15. 
• Testified that since South Farm had been substantially delayed by the City, they 
were concerned about granting a water line when nothing had been said about 
whether the water line would even serve the property, although Shane was 
adamant that it was needed right away to resolve pressure problems in Gardner 
Estates. R. 1283, p. 49,11. 16 - p. 50,11. 3. 
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• Testified that in his experience, it is customary for a developer to participate in the 
sizing of water lines on their property as well as the cost of the line. R. 1283, p. 
50,11 4 - p . 41,11. 20. 
• Testified that although no agreement was reached on the easement, Mr. Jones 
indicated that South Farm would have access to the line. A week later, in a visit to 
the property, Mr. Wallace discovered that installation of the water line was nearly 
completed. R. 1283, p. 51,11. 21 - p . 52,11. 18. 
• Testified that as a result Mr. Wallace stopped work on the water line and began 
negotiations to resolve the easement and the trespass. R. 1283, p. 52,11. 19 - p. 
53,11. 3 
• Testified that in order to resolve the situation and in exchange for the water 
easement at no cost the City Council agreed to pass a resolution to consider 
development of the South Farm consistent with the way South Farm was 
developing its land in Herriman. R. 1283, p. 52,11. 25 - p. 54,11. 15. 
• Testified that the City's attorney, Mr. Curtis advised the City Council not to vote 
for the resolution if the only thing they would be willing to support would be one 
acre lots. R. 1283, p. 53,11. 18 - p. - p. 56,11. 19; See also Exhibit 134. 
• Testified that according to the minutes of that meeting in Exhibit 134, the purpose 
of the water line was to solve water pressure and fire protection concerns in 
existing the City. R. 1283, p. 55,11. 20 - p. 58,11. 3. 
• Testified that the City adopted the resolution by a 5-0 vote of the City Council. R. 
1283, p. 58,11. 4 - p. 61,11. 20. See also Exhibit 38. 
• Testified that the City's plan for one acre lots is not consistent with the resolution, 
but South Farm's plan is. R. 1283, p. 61,11. 21 - p. 62,11. 15. 
• Testified that although the Resolution calls for the City to work with the developer 
in a speedy and timely fashion, the City did not do so. R. 1283, p. 62,11. 16 - 63, 
11. 11. 
• Testified that after the Resolution was adopted, a new mayor, Wayne Mortimer, 
was elected and a new planner was hired. South Farm was asked by the new 
Mayor to delay their application to go through a process with a committee of 
interested citizens, and South Farm began that process. R. 1283, p. 64,11. 7 - p. 
66,11. 22. 
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• Testified that the citizen's committee process took a couple of months, during 
which several meetings were cancelled and some were poorly attended. 
Ultimately, some time in March of 2002, the mayor scheduled a final meeting but 
none of the committee members showed up, Mayor Mortimer told them that there 
would be no more committee meetings and South Farm was handed comments on 
their development plans. R. 1283, p. 65,11. 23 - p. 66,11. 15. 
• Testified that about April, the new City planner laid out a schedule where he 
would address different areas in a series of meetings over the next several months. 
Area Four was postponed until late in the year and South Farm was shocked 
because this represented further delays. The City's focus shifted from the Quality 
Growth Plan to different concepts and principals. R. 1283, p. 66,11. 23 - p. 67,11. 
13. 
• Testified that South Farm submitted an application to the City May 6, 2002. R. 
1283, p. 67,11. 14-24. 
• Testified that although the application was complete, the applicant is required to 
state that they have been given instructions by the City on how to apply and that 
they have obtained the assistance of the City staff in making application and 
neither of those things were true. R. 1283, p. 68,11. 10 - p. 69,11. 2. 
• Testified that a comprehensive project plan was submitted July 2, 2002 based on 
the development experience with Salt Lake County. This was done because 
numerous attempts to work with the City staff and planner failed. R. 1284, p. 69, 
11. 3-20; See also Exhibit 50. 
• Testified that work on the Quality Growth Plan appeared to cease during this 
period and they began to talk about different Area 4 planning principles. R. 1283, 
p. 69, L.L 23 - p. 70, p. 4. 
• Testified that nothing happened on the application South Farm submitted, 
although the City progressed on the process of going over Planning Area Number 
4. In August, the staff presented a staff report and scheduled a hearing with the 
planning commission and recommended approval of the South Farm plan. On the 
night the plan was supposed to be heard, it was pulled from the agenda to allow 
the City more time to study the plan. The City indicated that they did not have the 
staff or the time to complete the study. R. 1283, p. 70,11. 15 - p. 71,11. 8. 
• Testified that in response to the City's complaint that they didn't have the staff to 
review the plan, South Farm proposed outsourcing the review of the plan to 
outside consultants. It took approximately two months for the city to decide and 
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another six months for staff to go out and hire the consultants. R. 1283, p. 71,11. 9 
-p . 72.11. 13. 
• Testified that there were consistent, ongoing disputes with the City over what 
South Farm would pay for. It appeared to South Farm that the City wanted a 
complete redraw of South Farm's plan and was trying to also get South Farm to 
pay for planning of the City outside the scope of South Farm's plan. R. 1283, p. 
72,11. 14-p . 73,11. 13. 
• Testified that when the outsourcing agreement was completed in April of 2003, 
South Farm paid $65,000 - $66,000 for the outsourcing. J.U. B. Consultants and 
Tischler Consultants began holding joint meetings to present the plan, and then the 
consultant would start working through the review process. R. 1283, p. 74,11. 2-
11. 
• Testified that the plan was reviewed against the city's planning area 4 and not the 
Quality Growth Plan. R. 1283, p. 74,11. 12 - p. 75 -11. 8; Exhibit 72. 
• Testified that after the report was issued, economic data was corrected and an 
economic consultant was hired to assist South Farm in dealing with those items. 
During that time, the City did not process South Farm's application, but instead, 
continued to process their alternate plan. R. 1283, p. 80,11. 15 - p. 82,11. 6. 
• Testified that the Planning Commission voted on the alternate plan and then 
recommended that plan to the City Council on October 7, 2003. R. 1283, p. 72,11. 
7-20. 
• Testified that South Farm continually objected to the alternate plan and 
complained to Mayor Mortimer that they were not receiving the promised work 
sessions. Mayor Mortimer assured Don that they would refocus and get back on 
track looking at the South Farm plan. R. 1283, p. 83,11. 1 - p. 84,11. 6. 
• Testified that at the city council meeting on December 9, 2003, or Exhibit 169, on 
pg. 2, Bates stamped 24766, Mr. Young determined that the South Farm 
application met all of the planning principles in district number four and 
recommended approval of the South Farm development application. R. 1283, p. 
84,11. 20 - p. 86,11. 15. 
• Testified that despite positive approval recommendations by J.U.B. Tischler, the 
city turned down South Farm's application. R. 1283, p. 86,11. 18-21. 
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• Testified that after all that time and effort, countless meetings and approximately 
$950,000 in expenses, South Farm determined that to continue with the City 
would be futile and joined with others to file a disconnection petition with the 
City. R. 1283, p. 87,11. 13-22. 
• Testified that the City held a public hearing and went through the public process to 
determine whether to let the disconnection property go. Following that process, 
they turned down the disconnection petition and made a decision not to voluntarily 
adjust their boundaries. R. 1283, p. 88,11. 1-11. 
• Testified that as a result of the City's refusal, South Farm and others filed the 
disconnection case. The case was later amended to include other petitioners. R. 
1283, p. 88, L.L 12-18. 
• Testified that one of the City Council members later indicated that he had made 
the wrong decision, and the City invited South Farm to sit down with them again 
and attempt to work out a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to settle the 
lawsuit, which was later passed by the City Council. R. 1283, p. 88,11. 25 - p. 89, 
11. 24. 
• Testified that as a result of that MOU, the City adopted a special development plan 
ordinance, which is common practice on large pieces of property. R. 1283, p. 91, 
11. 1-8. 
• Testified that although the City's proposed findings of fact say that South Farm 
did not submit a rezoning application, a rezoning application was filed and fees 
were paid. R. 1283, p. 91,11. 19-p . 92,11. 11. 
• Testified that a citizens group filed a referendum against the SDP ordinance, 
which showed South Farm that even if both parties completely fulfilled their 
obligations under the memorandum of understanding, the issue would never be 
settled because the citizens group told South Farm that they were going to 
referendum every action that the City Council would ever take on this project. R. 
1283, p. 92.11. 12-p . 93,11. 9. 
• Based on statute 10-2-502-7, testified that the disconnection is viable because it's 
been vacant land forever, and after it is disconnected, it will still be vacant land. 
R. 1283, p. 93,11. 2 1 - p . 94,11. 14. 
• Testified further that the land will be viable in Herriman after disconnection. R. 
1283, p. 94,11. 15-p . 95,11. 1. 
7 
• Testified that in his opinion, Salt Lake County would be capable of providing 
municipal services to the area in a cost-effective manner because it is basically 
vacant land. R. 1283, p. 95,11. 11 - p. 97,11. 10. 
• Testified that the proposed disconnection will not leave the municipality with an 
area within its boundaries for which the cost requirements or other burdens of 
providing municipal services would materially increase over previous years. R. 
1283, p. 97,11. 10 -p . 98,11.5. 
• Testified that the proposed disconnection will not make it economically or 
practically unfeasible for the City to continue as a city because the taxes are 
around $1,750 per year. R. 1283, p. 98,11. 6 - p. 99,11. 24. 
• Testified that justice and equity require disconnection of the property because it's 
been a tremendously long process dating back to 1993 in which South Farm has 
cooperated with the City despite the City's changes in planners and attorneys 
throughout the years. The process has been unbelievable and not consistent with 
what the developers have experienced in other cities, and while the process alone 
should be enough to require disconnection, the City also begged South Farm not to 
ever make an application. In addition, other landowners who were not able to 
spend a lot of money in planning efforts were stopped from even applying and for 
the 30 year history of the City; it hasn't done anything to provide services. There 
is no capital facilities plan, no infrastructure other than the water line which was 
put in for other purposes. Along with this dysfunctional process, the City United 
has promised to defeat South Farm any way they can. In terms of property rights, 
the City citizens and others use that land as a playground, they trespass, hunt, hike, 
and have had the use of that land, which South Farm has for the most part, 
tolerated. Sheep grazing on the property have been shot, and it's apparent that the 
City has no real intention of giving South Farm its private property rights on their 
own land. R. 1283, p. 99,11. 8 - p. 101,11. 10. 
• On redirect, testified that justice and equity are highly related and South Farm felt 
that the Resolution 2002-5 was an expression of the City's good faith and 
intention, and that he was told the same repeatedly. R. 1283, p. 155,11. 18 - p. 
156,11. 3. 
• Testified that the City's attorney, Mr. Curtis warned that that if the City did not 
intend to have anything but one acre lots, it should not pass the resolution. R. 
1283, p. 256,11. 4-24; R. 1283, p. 257,11. 1-14. 
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• Testified that to his knowledge, other than the 1993 general plan, no other plans 
developed by the City show exclusively one acre lots, including the Quality 
Growth Plan, or the City's alternative plan. R. 1283, p. 259,11. 1-14. 
• Testified that South Farm has always included some one acre lots since the 
beginning of its planning efforts. R. 1283, p. 259,11. 20-25. 
• Testified that in his analysis, if the development were to take place in Herriman, 
costs would not be imposed on the City. R. 1283, p. 261,11. 10-13. 
• Testified that he commissioned an analysis of the actual development of the City 
in terms of one-acre lots versus non-one acre lots (referencing Exhibit 211) and 
found that ratio to be 1,430 one acre lots versus 4,194 lots smaller than an acre. R. 
1283, p. 251,11. 2 2 - p . 262,11. 13. 
• Testified that Independence, another project in the City is a mixed-use project 
filed after the disconnection lawsuit that was approved at 7 - 7.2 units per acre. R. 
1283, p. 262,11. 14-21. 
• Testified that standard parlance of developers would consider 2.5 to 3 units per 
acre to be moderate to low density. R. 1283, p. 262,11. 22-25. 
• Testified that according to the Quality Growth Plan, referencing Exhibit 23, table 
on pg. 14, the total residential acreage is 5,541, which is bigger than the 
disconnect area by about 25%, including roughly 2.51 units per acre. R. 1283, p. 
263,11. 1-p. 264,11. 2. 
• Testified that projects such as the proposed mixed-use development are not a net 
money loser to cities and that he is not aware of any city which has been affected 
by a similar project in that way. R. 1283, p. 264,11. 3-16. 
• Testified that if the project is seen by the City as a net money loser, he does not 
see why they're fighting so hard to keep it. R. 1283, p. 264,11. 17-20. 
• In reviewing the traffic plan testified that there would be ways to route traffic that 
would have less impact on the City if the property is disconnected. Further 
testified that this and other issues such as the storm drain system, the regional 
storm facility, system improvements, and amenities were negotiated with the City 
and would benefit them - but if disconnected the developer would front those 
costs for Herriman through amenities for their benefit. R. 1283, p. 265,11. - p. 
269,11. 5. 
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• 
Testified that J.U.B.'s analysis, Exhibit 72, was updated even after their favorable 
recommendation before the December meeting. Exhibits 63 and 72. Also testified 
that additional information was provided to J.U.B. prompting them to state that 
South Farm met the planning principals for area 4. R. 1283, p. 269,11. 6 - p. 270, 
11.11. 
Testified that referencing Exhibit 72, the Tischler analysis showed negative 
numbers related to capital facilities because the city was trying to charge South 
Farm for a forestation that would service other properties. R. 1283, p. 273,11. 17 -
p. 275,11. 8. 
Mike Bradshaw (witness for the Landowners) 
Title: Vice President of Development and Director of Engineering and Planning. 
Education: 1996 BS Chemical Engineering, with an emphasis on environmental impact, 
completed some graduate work in civil engineering and land planning 
Work Experience: environmental field engineer performing soil, water and air quality 
analysis; worked with an engineering consulting firm doing environmental engineering 
and land development design; managed engineering consulting firm Nolte Associates; 
currently working with Sorenson Development to direct and manage their real estate 
projects. R. 1295, p. 5,11. 16 - p. 9,11. 3. 
Testimony: 
• Prepared and presented a chronology document outlining his involvement in the 
developer's attempts to work with the City to develop their property. R. 1295, p. 
9,11. 19 - p. 10,11. 9 or Exhibit 248. 
• Provided an overview of the topography and features of the Disconnection 
Property. R. 1295, p. 10,11. 10 - p. 12,11. 21; Exhibit 210. 
• Outlined the services and condition of the property with respect to the canal, 
bridges, walkways, drainage, soil, Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District 
facility and tanks, the Utah Power & Light substation, etc. Also provides the 
acreage of the disconnect area. R. 1295, p. 10,11. 2 - p. 13,11. 23. 
• Noted that there is a home on the property utilizing a septic tank for sewage, a 
well for water, and propane for heating. He further explains that there is no public 
roadway and the only service provided by the City is for garbage removal. R 
1295, p. 13,11. 2 4 - p . 14,11.23. 
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• Testified about the location of utility lines in the disconnect area and further 
discusses the 12" water line referred to in Mr. Wallace's testimony and its capacity 
to service the area. R. 1295, p. 14,11. 24 - p. 16,11. 24. 
• Testified that the 12" water line was not intended to service the disconnect area. 
R. 1295, p. 16 -p . 17,11. 13. 
• Testified about the general plan amendment zone change request filed with the 
City and its status with the City. R. 1295, p. 17,11. 14 - p. 17,11. 15; Exhibit 50. 
• Testified that to his knowledge, at the time of the zone change request, the City 
did not have a land-use plan or a capital facilities plan. R. 1295, p. 17,11. 23 - p. 
18,11.21. 
• Testified that a second application was filed as part of the MOU consent decree 
process this year because it was part of the agreement made in the MOU, and then 
briefly outlined the contents of the MOU and the process involved in its creation. 
The process was estimated as having taken six to seven months. R. 1295, p. 18,11. 
22 -p . 21,11. 20. 
• Outlined the process generally followed when a city requires additional detail or 
engineering work, traffic studies, R. 1295, p. 21,11. 21 - p. 22,11. 25. 
• Testified about delays after the request was filed on May 6, 2002 in getting any 
feedback on the project or getting scheduled on the agenda. R. 1295, p. 23,11. 16 
- p . 24,11. 5. 
• Testified that he would agree with Mr. Wallace's testimony on the J.U.B. report 
and the Tischler report. R. 1295, p. 23,11. 6 - p. 25,11. 7. 
• Testified that the City planner commenced to provide a redesign of the project 
without input from the landowners. R. 1295, p. 25,11. 8-19. 
• Testified that subsequent to July 3, 2002, the landowners responded to the 
concerns expressed by the City with additional plans or amendments to the plans. 
R. 1295, p. 26,11. 7 - p. 27,11. 6; See also Exhibits 222, 223, 224, 229, 233 and 
234 (reflecting changes and amendments). 
• Testified that the City's plan was passed by the planning commission in October 
of 2003 and the landowner's plan was put on the back burner, adding to the 
frustrations of the developers. R. 1295, p. 27,11. 7 - p. 28,11. 25. 
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• Testified that at the City Council meeting held December 9, 2003, although J.U. 
B., the City's contract planner at the time, recommended approval of the 
developer's general plan, the City Council turned it down. R. 1295, p. 18,11. 1 -
p. 29,11. 9. 
• Testified that the developer worked with two planners, two City attorneys, 
attended somewhere between 25-30 planning commission meeting, 30-40 city 
council meetings, three community planning meetings, and held 3-4 site visits for 
city officials since May of 2001 to December 2002. R. 1295, p. 29,11. 10 - p. 30, 
11. 13. 
• Testified that the developer spent approximately $950,000 in planning fees during 
the same time period. R. 1295, p. 30,11. 14-19. 
• Testified that although the City consistently told him that they wanted one acre 
lots, a review of historic the City that had already been developed showed that 
there were 4,194 lots smaller than one acre approved and existing in the City, or 
about 75% of existing lots. R. 1295, p. 31,11. 8 - 25. 
• Testified that one acre lots create spread and sprawl from a planning perspective 
and are difficult for communities to sustain. R. 1295, p. 32,11. 7 - p. 34,11.4. 
• Testified that developing the property in one acre lots would likely cost the City 
amenities because it wouldn't be economically feasible for developers to put them 
in and wouldn't have the property to put them on. R. 1295, p. 33,11. 5-25. 
• Testified about traffic and how the developer had worked to minimize any 
potential impact on the City. R. 1295, p. 34,11. 25 - p. 40,11. 24; p. 41,11. 15 - p. 
42,11. 11. 
• Testified that he calculated the number of petitioners that filed and the acreage 
they owned in the disconnect area as 72% when the total number of parcels was 
added up and divided by the total acreage. R. 1295, p. 42,11. 19 - p. 44,11. 24. 
• Testified that despite the City's proposed findings, a zone change was filed as 
required by the MOU on September 16, 2005. R. 1295, p. 44,11. 25 - p. 45,11. 13. 
• Testified that to his knowledge, the 12" water line has not been upgraded, and no 
additional collector roads have been planned or expanded to provide service to the 
disconnect area. R. 1295, p. 14 - p. 47,11. 6. 
12 
• Testified that to his knowledge, the City has not filed or passed a moderate income 
housing plan, comprehensive traffic plan, capital facilities plan, general plan 
(since 2002), storm drain plan, culinary or secondary water plan, or impact 
analysis. R. 1295, p. 46,11. 6 - p. 48,11. 19. 
• Testified that the City would still have vacant land and the ability to grow. R. 
1295, p. 48,11. 2 5 - p . 49,11. 9. 
• Testified that if the property were disconnected, there is no way that remaining the 
City would be required to pay any systems improvements. R. 1295, p. 50,11. 6 -
p. 52,11. 21. 
• Testified that storm waters from the Disconnection Property would not flow into 
historic the City. R. 1295, p. 52,11. - p. 53,11. 18; p. 53,11. 4 - p. 54,11. 19. 
• Testified that as part of the storm water plan, a secondary water plan had been 
created to utilize potential runoff. R. 1295, p. 53,11. 19 - p. 54,11. 4. 
• Testified that sewers in the disconnection area are controlled by South Valley 
Sewer District, which would not change if the disconnection is granted. R. 1295, 
p. 54,11. 20 - p. 55,11. 11. 
• Testified that he has not seen any traffic study or master plan completed by the 
City showing that existing City streets have been planned and built to 
accommodate traffic from the disconnection area. R. 1295, p. 56, 11. 14-25. 
• Testified that from May of 2001, he attended somewhere near 100 meetings with 
staff and the City. R. 1295, p. 57,11.7-20. 
• Testified that from May of 2001 to November of 2005, the developer spent 
approximately $1.2 million trying to develop their land. R. 1295, p. 58,11. 3-24. 
• Testified that the Disconnection Property does not create a peninsula and 
explained the process he used to make that determination. R. 1295, p. 59,11. 3 - p. 
60,11. 19. 
• Testified that there is no contiguous incorporated area and explained the closest 
incorporated areas and the process he followed to calculate the boundary line of 
unincorporated area. p. 61,11. 18 - p. 66,11. 2. 
• Testified that in his professional opinion, the disconnect area is viable because it's 
vacant land and once it is disconnected, it will still be vacant land. p. 66,11. 3-16. 
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• Testified that the proposed disconnection will not leave the City with an area 
within its boundaries for which the cost requirement or burdens of providing 
municipal services would material increase over previous years because it isn't 
costing the City a material amount now, and that won't change with 
disconnection.. R. 1295, p. 66,11. 17 - p. 67,11. 9. 
• Testified that the disconnection will not make it economically or practically 
infeasible for the City to continue to function as a municipality because it is 
currently vacant land and the City is not receiving anything from it currently other 
than negligible property taxes, and it won't receive anything after it's disconnected 
either. R. 1295, p. 66,11. 1 - p. 68,11. 3. 
• Testified that the proposed disconnection will not materially increase the City's 
cost of providing municipal services because it is vacant land that Salt Lake 
County will not need to provide any more services then, than it does now. L. 
1295, p. 68,11.4-69,11. 1. 
• Reviewed his earlier testimony that the effects of the proposed disconnection 
would have negligible impact on the City. R. 1295, p. 69,11. 2 - p. 72,11. 14. 
Dave Millheim (witness for the Landowners) 
Title: Partner, Development Associates 
Education: 1985 BS in Financial Planning; 1987 MA in Public Administration with an 
emphasis in urban planning and city management. Brigham Young University 
Work Experience: worked for Park City at the City Manager's office while in grad 
school; Assistant to the City Manager at Morgan Hill, CA; Director of Human Resources 
in Palm Desert, CA; City Manager of South Jordan City, UT; Development Partner since 
1998 
Testimony: 
• Testified that the disconnection was viable because it is raw land today with 
minimal services and will remain the same immediately after disconnection. 
R.1295,Pgl76,ll. 8-20. 
• Testified that the project would remain viable in Herriman. R.1295, Pg 136,11. 
18-21. 
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• Testified that the City would remain feasible after disconnection. R.1295, Pg 177, 
11. 1-12. 
• Testified that Salt Lake County would be able to service the disconnected 
property. R. 1295, Pg 177,11. 13-25' R. 1295, Pg 178,11. 1-2. 
• Testified that he chose to participate in the disconnection lawsuit because: 
o He had researched the history between the City and South Farm. R. 1295, 
p. 155,11. 1-16. 
o He spoke to other development partners that had completed project in the 
area. R.1295, p. 155,11.15-16. 
o He had experience both on the public and private side with the City and 
found it a frustrating experience, p. 155,11.17 - 157 11. 4; R. 1295, p. 16011. 
4-17. 
o Experience on the Hamilton Project trying to figure out how to provide 
service and water tie-ins. R. 1295, p. 156,11. 5-19. 
o He testified that he does not need to get hit by a baseball bat to know it's 
going to hurt. R.1295, p. 158 11.9-12. 
o Experience with Mr. Shelby's parcel, Hamlet Homes, and a third 
development in the same area as the Hamlet proposal influenced his 
decision to remain in the lawsuit. R.1295, p. 158 11. 22 - 159 11. 9. 
• Explained the process from the time the City approached the developers about 
setting on certain conditions, later called a memorandum of understanding, to the 
adoption of the SDP zone. R.1295, p. 162,11.4 - p.165 11. 4. 
• Testified that South Hills had made an application to the SDP zone, public 
hearings were held and the planning commission voted on the application. R.1295 
p. 165,11.8-Pg 166,11. 9. 
Tracy Burnham (witness for the Landowners) 
Title: Owner of Property in Planning Area Four, 139, 141, 144, 149, 150 & 143; 
Managing Member of T&M Holdings, L.L.C. 
Testimony: 
• Testified that he is the owner of property that lies within planning area number 4 
comprised of approximately 44 acres. R. 1295, p. 209,11. 2-12. 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
Testified that he signed the disconnection petition because he determined that it 
would be in his best interest through talking to other people because it would be a 
more viable development. R. 1295, p. 210,11. 2-10. 
Testified that he purchased the property as an investment, but did not file a 
development application because he was discouraged by his realtor's experience 
with the City and felt that as a single property owner, he didn't have very good 
potential to get an approval. R. 1295, p. 210,11. 15 - p. 211,11. 1. 
Testified that he feels that the property would be viable if disconnected because it 
would better facilitate development. R. 1295, p. 211,11. 12-19. 
Testified that justice and equity require disconnection because the City has little 
infrastructure or ability to provide the services needed to complete the 
development. R. 1295, p. 211,11. 2 0 - p . 212,11. 4. 
Rod Mills (witness for the Landowners) 
Title: Civil Engineer 
Education: 1984 BA in Civil Engineering from the University of Utah 
Work Experience: Caldwell, Richards & Sorenson Consulting Engineering (17 years); 
owned a small engineering firm in Las Vegas for a short time; worked with VanGorman, 
Frank and Associates (1 year); currently employed at Nolte Associates. 
Testimony: 
• Testified that the disconnect area would be viable upon disconnection. R.1295, p. 
229,11.1-2. 
• Testified that storm drainage generated in planning area 4 would not have a 
negative impact on the City. R. 1295, p. 226,11. 20 - p. 228,11. 7. 
• Testified that water services, municipal services and water and sewer mains in 
planning area 4 would not cause the City to be left with an area within its 
boundaries for which the cost requirements or other burdens would increase 
materially over the years. R. 1295, p. 229,11. 19 - p. 231-11. 12; See also redirect 
R. 1295, p. 260,11. 7 - p . 261,11.7. 
16 
• Testified that sewer services would not be affected by the disconnect area because 
service is currently provided by South Valley Sewer District and will remain so. 
R. 1295, p. 226,11. 2 -16 . 
• Testified that there is very little water infrastructure in the disconnection area. R. 
1295, p. 223, L.L 18-24; R. 1295, p. 224,11. 1 - Pg 225,11. 16. 
• Testified that there is no secondary water system on the Disconnection Property. 
R. 1295, p. 225,11. 17-21. 
• Testified that there is no sanitary services in the disconnect area with the exception 
of the service provided for the Jordan Valley treatment plant. R-1295, p. 225,11. 
2 2 - p . 226,11. 1. 
Dave Goeres (witness for the Landowners) 
Title: Civil Transportation Engineer 
Education: PE in Utah and four other states; practicing for over 20 years 
Work Experience: completed master transportation studies for West Jordan, West Valley 
City, and Holladay; currently working on Tooele City, and Salt Lake County; completed 
many TIS (traffic impact studies) through the Salt Lake Valley and throughout the state 
and major corridor studies 
Testimony: 
• Testified that there will be no measurable impacts or burden to the City and 
explained his reasoning. R. 1295, p. 266,11. 8 - p. 184,11. 19. 
• Testified that in his opinion, the City has not treated the developers fairly in some 
comments that were made that he considered being unfair. R. 1295, p. 293,11. 9-
13. 
Quinn Barton (witness for the Landowners) 
Experience: a founding member of the City (1978); resident since 1973; member of the 
first the City Council 
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Testimony: 
• Testified that the City hasn't provided any services to the Disconnection Property. 
R. 1295, p. 293,11. 14-20. 
• Testified that he felt that the City had been unreasonable in this dispute. R. 1295, 
p. 311,11. 10 -p . 313, L. 5. 
• Testified that he was a founding member of the City, and that the Disconnection 
Property was not considered a part of the original boundaries of the City. R. 1295, 
p. 291,11. 8 - p . 292,11. 20. 
Karen Wikstrom (witness for the Landowners) 
Title: Owner of Wikstrom Economic and Planning Consultants 
Education: BA in Economics from Smith College in MA; 1995 MA of Finance from the 
University of Utah 
Work Experience: Vice President of the Consulting Group for Wallace Associates 
Consulting Group (1982-1989); Owner of Wikstrom Economic and Planning Consultants 
(1989 to present) specializing in real estate feasibility, urban planning and fiscal impact 
analysis; provided expert testimony in King Holdings v. Washington City, Woodbury 
Corporation v. The Ogden City RDA, and Mast v. Draper City; has evaluated the 
feasibility of over $2 billion worth of real estate; market research, entitlement, and other 
real estate advisory work for Kennecott Land, Prudential Real Estate, the Equitable 
Group, Cumming Investment, Leucadia, and Geneva Steel; prepared general plans or 
small area plans for Tooele County, Salt Lake City, South Salt Lake, Taylorsville, 
Murray, Midvale, Sandy, and Smithfield; fiscal impacts for Daybreak Community 
(Kennecott), annexation of Deer Crest to Park City, annexation of United Park City to 
Park City, annexation of the Union area to Midvale City, annexation of the Mt. Air area 
to Salt Lake City and incorporation of Marriott SlaterviUe, Hooper, and the Cache Young 
area in Cache Valley. R. 1295, p. 313,11. 24 - p. 316,11. 16. 
Testimony: 
• Testified that her report consist of two separate sections. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 
130. The first section addresses the issues raised by the disconnection statute. 
The second section of report reviewed development scenarios. R. 1295, p.323. 
In generating her report discussing the disconnection Ms. Wikstrom spoke 
with multiple individuals employed in various governmental agencies. R. 
1295, p.320-21. However, due to the litigation Ms. Wikstrom was unable to 
speak with staff at either the City or Herriman. R. 1295, p. 322. 
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• Concluded the disconnection is viable because the subject property could 
function in either Salt Lake County or Herriman for the following reasons: R. 
1295, p.324,11. 1-17. 
o There is very limited tax revenue produced by the disconnection 
property and it would cause no material impact to the City. R. 1295, p. 
324,11. 18-p . 326,11.5. 
o The $54 million deficit that has been discussed was arrived at without 
access to staff and the figures relied on used per capita estimates to keep 
a consistent analysis between the City and Herriman. R. 1295, p. 326. 
o Any time you look at residential land in isolation, it's going to look 
negative for two reasons. R. 1295, p. 326,11. 12 - p. 328,11. 2. 
• There is a residential deduction on property tax revenues while 
every other property is taxed at market value. R. 1295, p. 328,11. 
3-8. 
• Cities have changed their revenue structure and now rely 
approximately 60% on sales tax revenues. Residential properties 
have already reduced the tax base by the 45% residential 
deduction and there are no other tax revenues, for the most part. 
R. 1295, p. 328,11. 8 - p . 332,11. 16. 
o Testified that the property would be viable if developed in Herriman. R. 
1295, p. 331,11. 17-22. 
• Concluded that most cities, at least from an economic standpoint, would be 
happy to have such a development. R. 1295, p. 332,11. 7-12. 
• Testified that the proposed disconnection would not leave the City with an 
area within its boundaries for which the cost requirements or other burdens 
of providing municipal services would materially increase over previous 
years because she couldn't come up with service costs that would 
materially import or change for any dingle department and they'd be losing 
less that one-tenth of one percent of the revenues of the City. R. 1295, p. 
332,11. 12 -p . 333,11. 17. 
• Testified that the proposed disconnection would not make it economically 
or practically unfeasible for the City to continue as a municipality. R. 
1295, p. 333, L. 2 1 - p . 334,11. 17. 
• Testified that she believes that Salt Lake County would be capable of 
providing cost-effective services to the disconnection area. R. 1295, p. 334, 
11. 18-p . 335,11. 17. 
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• Testified that it would take approximately 40 years to absorb one acre lots 
on the disconnection property if it were to be developed as the City would 
like to see it. R. 1295, p. 335,11. 22 - p. 339,11. 11 and Exhibit 130. 
• Testified that the City would not be impacted by either revenue or cost if 
the property were to disconnect in terms of impact fees. R. 1295, p. 339,11. 
12-p . 340,11.5. 
Shane Jones (witness for the City) 
Title: Civil Engineer 
Education: 1992 BS from Brigham Young University; MA in Engineering from 
University of Utah (1996) 
Work Experience: currently employed by Provo Water Resources as principal water 
sources engineer; employed by Gilson Engineering for 6 years; the City Engineer for 6 
years (1999 - 1/4/2006) 
Testimony on Cross Examination: 
• Testified that no formal analysis has been completed by the City for the 
disconnect area in terms of traffic studies, water systems, loss of impact fees, 
economy of scale loss, etc. R. 1297, p. 7,11. 11 - p. 16,11. 24. 
• Testified that the land use plan was not complete at the time of trial despite the 
fact that the City had been working on it since at least 1999. R. 1297, p. 143,11. 
2 4 - p . 146,11.24. 
Blaine Gehring (witness for the City) 
Title: City Planner 
Education: 1972 BA in Sociology, with an emphasis in government studies from the 
University of Utah; 1986 MA in Regional Community Planning from Kansas State 
University; 1987 MBA from University of Phoenix 
Work Experience: the City Planner for two years, overseeing all planning functions for 
planning and zoning, preparation, updates of the plans, zoning ordinances, subdivision 
ordinances, processing of applications for general plan amendments, zone changes, 
conditional use permits, and anything appearing before the board of adjustments or code 
enforcement 
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Testimony on Cross Examination: 
• On cross-examination, testified that he thought that the special development plan 
ordinance provided a good planning tool and that he does not understand why it 
should be subject to a referendum. R. 12986, p. 171,11. 4-14. 
• Testified that the peninsula definition is in two parts, with the first half of the test 
being whether the area is surrounded on more than half its boundary, but not 
completely by incorporated territory - but that it doesn't say disconnection area -
it says unincorporated area. R. 1296, p. 173,11. 2-16; Exhibit 104. 
• Testified that if the words of the statue mean what they say they mean, without the 
words "disconnection area", then it's not surrounded by more than 50% of its 
boundary and further noted that he did not see anything in the statute that 
mentions "disconnection area". R. 1295, p. 174,11. 1-12; Exhibit 104. 
• Testified that if the math is done correctly and you measure even the boundary of 
unincorporated Salt Lake, Mr. Bradshaw's math is in the ballpark when it's listed 
at 113,000 feet. R. 1296, p. 174,11. 13-22. 
• Testified that he knows that Mr. Bradshaw is a competent professional capable of 
running a CAD system. R. 1296, p. 174,11. 23 - p. 175,11. 7. 
• Testified that if he agrees that the words mean unincorporated rather than 
disconnection, and don't specify where the points are, that Mr. Bradshaw's 
analysis of peninsula is right, based on his assumptions. R. 1296, p. 175,11. 8-12. 
• Testified that with regard to Mr. Gardiner's cross-examination of Mr. Bradshaw 
and his attempt to assert that there's no way you could ever get a peninsula if the 
meaning of the words was unincorporated territory - if drawn as Mr. Baird 
demonstrated, then that assertion would be incorrect and the peninsula test could 
be met because the property is more than 50% surrounded by unincorporated 
territory. R. 1296, p. 174,11. 16-p . 176,11. 19. 
• Agreed that if you draw a line form one part of the unincorporated territory to the 
other part of the incorporated territory, across the side, it's less than 25%. R. 1296, 
p. 176,11. 20-24. 
• Agreed that in his deposition about the property to the south of the disconnection 
area, he was unaware of the county line as it related to Camp Williams, and thus 
21 
could not make a determination about whether there was a peninsula or not. R. 
1296, p. 177,11.5-14. 
Mayor Claudia Anderson 
• Testified that she has heard complaints of the City processing applications. R. 
1297, p. 23,11. 10-12. 
• Admitted that she made the motion to pass the resolution for mixed-use 
development, with the advice of Mr. Curtis, the City's former City Attorney that 
they should not pass the Resolution if they were not comfortable with mixed use 
development. R. 1297, p. 41,11. 6 - p. 45,11. 18. 
• Appeared confused and had difficulty remember things such as whether or not she 
had read South Farm's application before voting against it. She had to be read 
extensive excerpts from her depositions to recall her statements or actions. R. 
1297, p. 47,11. 19 -p . 50,11.2. 
22 
ADDENDUM B 
ADDENDUM B 
"Peninsula" 
The Direct examination of Mike Bradshaw on Peninsula: 
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18 Mr. Bradshaw, I'm going to put up the 
19 statute where that defines the definition of 
20 peninsula. That's section 10-1-104. Are you 
21 familiar with that? 
22 A. I am. 
23 Q. Mr. Bradshaw, would you read the first 
24 portion of that definition? 
25 A. Yes. It says, a peninsula, when used 
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1 to describe an unincorporated area, means an area 
2 surrounded on more than half of its boundary 
3 distance, but not completely, by incorporated 
4 territory. 
5 Q. Mr. Bradshaw, as you read the rest of 
6 that and you are aware of it, how would you 
7 describe the test that subsection 6 requires in 
8 order to find a peninsula? 
9 A. Well, I believe it's in two parts. 
10 Q. And the part you just read? 
11 A. It is part one. 
12 Q. And if you don't meet the first 
13 requirements of part one? 
14 A. Then it's not a peninsula. 
15 Q. And the connector word, could you point 
16 to the and that's critical there? 
17 A. And. 
18 Q. And then the second part of the test, 
19 and you have to do both, do you not? 
20 A. Yes, in order to be a peninsula. 
21 Q. Alright. Mr. Bradshaw, I'm going to 
22 draw your attention to exhibit 209A. Can you 
23 point out to the Court the disconnect area? 
24 A. Yeah. The disconnect area is 
25 approximately in this area right here. 
l 
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1 Q. Right here? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Mr. Bradshaw, as you look at that, are 
4 there some incorporated territory on certain 
5 portions of that disconnect property? 
6 A. There are. 
7 Q. And could you describe which one this 
8 is? 
9 A. That's Herriman. 
10 Q. On the west? 
11 A. Herriman on the west, Bluff dale on the 
12 east, and Riverton to the north. 
13 Q. Now, Mr. Bradshaw, what about the 
14 south? 
15 A. On the south, there are no incorporated 
16 territories immediately adjacent to the disconnect 
17 property. 
18 Q. In fact, are there any contiguous 
19 incorporated? 
20 A. There's no contiguous incorporated 
21 area. 
22 Q. Can you describe to the Court the 
23 closest incorporated areas? 
24 A. It looks like from this map you can 
25 see, you have Lehi, Eagle Mountain, Cedar Fort and 
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1 then maybe the next one would be out towards 
2 Tooele on that side. 
3 Q. Mr. Bradshaw, how do you draw a 
4 boundary to those? 
5 A. It's very difficult. They are not 
6 contiguous, so you kind of have to pick an 
7 infinite boundary, I guess. It could go on 
8 forever. 
9 Q. And are there more than one choices? 
10 A. Many choices. 
11 Q. Are all of them more than one-half of 
12 that area that's surrounded by incorporated 
2 
13 (inaudible)? 
14 A. No. They are less, and so there would 
15 be a peninsula. 
16 Q. Mr. Bradshaw, the boundaries here are 
17 greater than this area here, is it not? 
18 A. That's correct. Yes. Those boundaries 
19 would be greater and, therefore, it would not be 
20 more than half of its boundary, and therefore, it 
21 would not be a peninsula. 
22 Q. Alright, Mr. Bradshaw, let's turn to 
23 the second part of the test. Could you read that 
24 for the Court? 
25 A. Yeah. It says-speaking about the 
R1295Page63 
1 boundary again, and situated so that the length of 
2 the line drawn across the unincorporated area from 
3 an incorporated area to an incorporated area on 
4 the opposite side shall be less than 25% of the 
5 total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated 
6 area. 
7 Q. Okay. The key words here are 
8 incorporated and unincorporated, are they not? 
9 A. Yes, they are. 
10 Q. I'm going to draw your attention to 
11 exhibit 275, Mr. Bradshaw. Did you prepare this 
12 exhibit? 
13 A. I did. 
14 Q. And could you describe the colors and 
15 what they represent? 
16 A. Yes. The pink color here to the north 
17 describes the Riverton boundary. The gray area on 
18 the west describes the Herriman boundary. The 
19 yellow describes the boundary of Bluff dale after 
20 disconnect, and the white area describes the 
21 unincorporated territory that would be left after 
22 disconnect. 
23 Q. Alright. Did you calculate the 
24 boundary line of unincorporated area? 
25 A. Yes. The perimeter, as I'm showing 
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1 here on the drawing, is 113,090 feet. 
2 Q. And the critical factor of 25%? 
3 A. What I did is, I took two points here 
4 on the boundary that were opposite from the 
5 Bluff dale boundary and drew— 
6 Q. Mr. Bradshaw, what I need to know is, 
7 what the 25% figure is? 
8 A. Oh. The 25% of that perimeter boundary 
9 would be 28,200 feet. 
10 Q. Alright, and then go on with your 
11 narrative, please. 
12 A. Then what I did is, I picked two points 
13 that were opposite of the boundary, and drew two 
14 arcs at 28,200 feet-
15 Q. Excuse me, Mr. Bradshaw, are they 
16 represented by Al and A2? 
17 A. Yes, they are. 
18 Q. Could you show the Court, because it's 
19 difficult to read it. 
20 A. Okay. Al here, A2 here, and here are 
21 the arcs that describe that area that is 28,200 
22 feet from those points. 
23 Q. The radius of the arch again? 
24 A. The radius of the arch being 28,200 
25 feet. 
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1 Q. And so, any place that it exceeded the 
2 arch it would exceed the 28,200? 
3 A. It would exceed the 28,200 and, 
4 therefore, not be a peninsula. 
5 Q. Are there numerous places that occurs? 
6 A. There are numerous places where that 
7 occurs. 
8 Q. As you read the statute, 10-1-104, does 
9 it say where you have to draw the line? 
10 A. It doesn't give you any indication of 
11 where to draw the line from. 
12 Q. Could you, if you chose to, draw a line 
13 from one incorporated area to another that would 
14 be less than 28,200? 
15 A. Yes, you could. 
4 
16 Q. Are you required to ? 
17 A. No, it doesn't. It just indicates to 
18 draw a line from an incorporated territory to 
19 another incorporated area across the opposite 
20 side. 
21 Q. What is your conclusion now in regard 
22 to the area that would be considered to be 
23 unincorporated as to whether or not it meets 
24 either the first test of subsection 6 or the 
25 second? 
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1 A. I believe it doesn't meet either one of 
2 the tests and, therefore, it's not a peninsula. 
Cross Examination of Blaine Gehring: 
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2 MR. BAIRD: I'll withdraw, Your Honor. 
3 I apologize. Mr. Garing, let me show you another 
4 peninsula map, and let me put the statute up on 
5 the screen. Let me get a couple of them out. 
6 Pardon me, Your Honor. It will just take me a 
7 second. You would acknowledge, would you not, 
8 that the definition is essentially in two parts, 
9 with the first half of the test being whether the 
10 area is surrounded on more than half its boundary, 
11 but not completely by incorporated territory. 
12 That's what it says, right? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And it doesn't say disconnection area, 
15 does it? It says unincorporated area? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. And you would also acknowledge in a 
18 matter—I did it again. I put this upside down 
19 one more time. As a matter of simple 
20 mathematics, the unincorporated area that results 
21 from the disconnection is not surrounded on more 
22 than half of its boundaries, because this whole 
23 thing would be the unincorporated area, by 
24 municipal territory and more than 50%, right? 
5 
25 A. I don't agree with that interpretation. 
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1 Q. I understand you don't agree with the 
2 interpretation, but if that's the right 
3 interpretation, if the words of the statute mean 
4 what they say they mean, then you don't add the 
5 word disconnection area, like you do, then you 
6 would agree with me that it's not surrounded by 
7 more than 50% of its boundary, right? 
8 A. I would agree with that. 
9 Q. Alright, and there's nothing in the 
10 statute at all that mentions the word 
11 disconnection area in 104, is there? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. And you would also agree with Mr. 
14 Bradshaw's math, that if you do his math the 
15 right way and you measure even the boundary of 
16 unincorporated Salt Lake, he's ballpark right at 
17 113,000 feet? 
18 A. Based on his assumptions, yes. 
19 Q. Yes, that's my point. He's ballpark 
20 right. I mean, it may be off by a foot or two 
21 here or a foot or two there, right? Is that yes? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Alright, and if you do the radiuses as 
24 he has done them, he's ballpark right. He can 
25 run a CAD system just as good as you can run a 
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1 CAD system, right? 
2 A. Correct. 
3 Q. And you know that because you worked 
4 with him all the time on the CAD systems for 
5 month after month after month, and he's competent, 
6 he's professional, and he does it right, right? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. So, if you agree that the words mean 
9 unincorporated, as opposed to disconnection, and 
10 don't specify where the points are, that Mr. 
11 Bradshaw's analysis of peninsula is right, right? 
6 
12 A. Based on his assumptions. 
13 Q. I understand that. So, the Court just 
14 gets to pick one, right? 
15 A. I suppose. 
16 Q. And let's take for a second, you were 
17 here during Mr. Gardiner's cross-examination of 
18 Mr. Bradshaw? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And remember him trying to say that 
21 there's no way that you could ever get a 
22 peninsula if you used the meaning of the words 
23 here that says unincorporated territory? Do you 
24 remember him saying that? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Well, let's show you how that can 
2 happen. You see this hole here between West 
3 Valley—pardon me. Taylorsville is spelled wrong. 
4 Taylorsville and West Jordan? Do you see that? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. That is fully surrounded by 
7 incorporated territory, correct? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. So, if I drew a rectangle in here, with 
10 the short side—Let's say I drew a little 
11 rectangle right here. I'm not going to draw on 
12 that, but—Well, I can, because this is my 
13 exhibit. Let's just assume that I drew a long 
14 rectangle here, and I tried t disconnect that. 
15 That's a peninsula under that test, isn't it? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Because it's more than 50% surrounded 
18 by incorporated territory, right? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And if you draw a line from one part of 
21 the incorporated territory to the other part of 
22 the incorporated territory, across the side, it's 
23 less than 25%, right? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. So, it's theoretically possible at 
7 
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1 least that the statute isn't as dysfunctional as 
2 Mr. Gardiner tried to make it out to be on cross-
3 examination of Mr. Bradshaw, correct? 
4 A. I wouldn't agree with that. 
5 Q. I didn't expect that you would, Mr. 
6 Garing. And remember that I asked you in your 
7 deposition about the property to the south of the 
8 disconnection area, and you told me in that 
9 deposition that you were unaware of the county 
10 line as it related to Camp Williams and, thus, 
11 you couldn't make a determination about whether 
12 there was a peninsula or not. Do you remember 
13 that? 
14 A. I remember that. 
Opening Statement from Counsel on Peninsula: 
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19 Now. if I can take the easier one, Your 
20 Honor, and the testimony will be from Mr. Bradshaw 
21 on this issue. This is the definition that Mr. 
22 Gardner talked about, 10-1 -104 for peninsula. 
23 Where's my book-275? Your Honor, the definition 
24 is written, as you can see, in two parts. The 
25 first part of the definition—thank you. I'm 
R 1283 Page 18 
1 sorry. I missed it. The definition is in two 
2 parts, and Mr. Bradshaw will be our witness on 
3 this. 
4 The first says, peninsula, when used to 
5 describe an unincorporated area, means an area— 
6 pardon, Your Honor~an area. Notice it doesn't 
7 say the disconnection area. It says an area, 
8 with the antecedent operative word being 
9 unincorporated. Surrounded on more than one-half 
10 of its boundary distance, but not completely, but 
11 incorporated territory. That's the first half of 
12 the definition. So, if you don't comply with the 
8 
13 first half of the definition, you don't get into 
14 the second part, and I'm going to address both 
15 parts. 
16 Here is the problem with that, Your 
17 Honor. This is exhibit 209, and if I may hold it 
18 up so Mr. Gardiner can see it. This is the 
19 unincorporated area that would result from the 
20 disconnection. It's actually-this is the part 
21 that is going to be disconnected, ballpark here, 
22 but the unincorporated area includes all of this 
23 property here, which is (inaudible), but is 
24 clearly unincorporated. 
25 You will also note, Your Honor, that 
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1 the statute doesn't reference the county line as 
2 any boundary. It simply says, surrounded on more 
3 than one-half of its distance by incorporated 
4 territory. 
5 As a simple fact of mathematics, Your 
6 Honor, because this boundary is open here, it's 
7 open here, it's open to the universe, by a 
8 mathematical definition, this unincorporated area 
9 that results from the disconnection, which is what 
10 the statute says, not the disconnected territory, 
11 isn't surrounded on more than an infinitesimal 
12 part of its boundary by incorporated territory. 
13 Thus, it doesn't meet the first half of the test. 
14 It also doesn't meet the second half of 
15 the test, and the second half of the test says, 
16 and situated so that the length of a line drawn 
17 across the unincorporated area from an 
18 unincorporated area to an incorporated area. 
19 Notice it doesn't say the disconnection property. 
20 On the opposite side shall be less than 25% of 
21 the total aggregate boundaries of the 
22 unincorporated area. 
23 Even if you gave them the charitable 
24 assumption that you were referring only to the 
25 unincorporated area in Salt Lake County, which of 
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9 
1 course is not what the statute says, but even if 
2 you gave them that charitable assumption, what we 
3 have done, Your Honor, is essentially say which 
4 points you are supposed to pick. 
5 We picked a couple of points on 
6 unincorporated territory. We picked this point, 
7 quite honestly, because it seems to be the 
8 farthest away point from anybody else on the 
9 unincorporated territory. We picked that point as 
10 point Al. We calculated the perimeter of the 
11 unincorporated Salt Lake County area that would 
12 result from the disconnection. That perimeter is 
13 approximately 113,090 feet. Now, that's 
14 approximate, because nobody went out and surveyed 
15 it, Your Honor. We just did a CAD program, point 
16 to point, punched the button in the CAD system, 
17 but it's approximately 113,000 feet. Twenty-five 
18 percent of 113,000 feet is 28,200 feet. 
19 What we then did, was we took a couple 
20 of logical points, Al and A2, and we ran arcs 
21 with radius of 28,200 feet, and if you run the 
22 arched radius of 28,200 feet, you will see that 
23 essentially anything, any boundary that is in the 
24 outside of that point makes it non-peninsula. Any 
25 boundary over this remaining boundary that's 
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1 inside the point means that might arguably be a 
2 peninsula if it met the first definition. What 
3 the Court can clearly see is, there are a vast 
4 number of points from either Al or A2 with which 
5 it does meet the definition, so it doesn't create 
6 a peninsula. 
7 Now, the statute, I will acknowledge 
8 with Mr. Gardiner, is not a model of clarity. It 
9 doesn't tell you how to pick points Al or A2, and 
10 I would certainly acknowledge that Mr. Garing, who 
11 is the city's witness, or Mr. Jones, one or the 
12 other, he picks a point here and a point here in 
13 this connection area, and he used the perimeter of 
14 the disconnection area, which of course is not 
10 
15 what the statute says, but he used the perimeter 
16 of the disconnection area and guess what? He was 
17 able to pick two numbers for which the resulting 
18 choke point is smaller than 25%. That's easy to 
19 do. I could do the same thing, but that's not 
20 what the statute says. 
21 The statute legally is more clearly 
22 interpreted in this manner. 
Closing Argument of Counsel on Peninsula:: 
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9 3C(iii)—peninsula. If I may? The 
10 statute, I think everybody would agree, is 
11 probably not a model of clarity, but Mr. Garing 
12 didn't dispute Mr. Bradshaw's map, and I won't go 
13 over it in detail. It's a two-part test we 
14 showed— 
15 THE COURT: Well, let me ask you a 
16 question about this. One of the rules of 
17 statutory construction, as I understand it, is 
18 that you try and give effect to each portion of 
19 the statute. 
20 MR. BAIRD: Yes, Sir. 
21 THE COURT: You read them to avoid 
22 redundancy that they are just saying the same 
23 thing over and over again. Can you come up with 
24 any scenario on that map where a disconnection 
25 would create a peninsula where it would not also 
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1 create an island? 
2 MR. BAIRD: Yes, I can. Yes, I can, 
3 because this is already an island, Your Honor. 
4 It's not creating an island. It's creating a 
5 peninsula. Now, the island may be here already, 
6 and since it's here, nobody is going to kill it 
7 and get rid of it. 
8 THE COURT: Well, when you are saying 
9 that, aren't you actually reading part one of the 
10 peninsula test just the way you would not want it 
11 
11 read in this case, in the sense that you are 
12 focusing on the disconnection area, not on the 
13 incorporation area? 
14 MR. BAIRD: No, I'm not, because what it 
15 says is, that the area, when used to describe an 
16 unincorporated area, means an area. So, I'm using 
17 it to describe an unincorporated area. I'm not 
18 using it to describe the disconnecting area, per 
19 se. In this case, as a mathematical case, they 
20 happen to be co-terminus and identical, but it's 
21 not one that's driving the other definition, Your 
22 Honor. 
23 In this case, you have to ignore, to 
24 read it the way the city reads it, you have to 
25 read in-that's the other rule of statutory 
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1 construction, is you read the words as they are, 
2 not as somebody wishes them to be, and if you 
3 read 104.6, Your Honor, and no where does it say 
4 you look at the disconnection area. 
5 Now, I would submit to Your Honor that 
6 if that's what they meant when they wrote 502.7 
7 in 2003, when they re-wrote it, it would have 
8 been really simple to say the disconnection area 
9 leaves or creates one or more islands or 
10 peninsulas, but that's not what it says. It says 
11 the proposed disconnection will not leave or 
12 create one or more islands of peninsula. 
13 So, you would go to the definition of 
14 peninsulas, and peninsulas only talks about 
15 unincorporated areas. So, you have to read the 
16 two things together, and you look at the 
17 definition of peninsula, and that's what it is. 
18 So, we think it fails—this is a big one-we 
19 think it fails the first half of the peninsula 
20 test. 
21 But, even if it meets the first half of 
22 the peninsula test, Your Honor, it doesn't meet 
23 the second half of the peninsula test, because it 
24 clearly says: situated so that the length of a 
25 line drawn across the unincorporated area. It 
12 
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1 doesn't say the unincorporated area resulting from 
2 a disconnection. It says the unincorporated area. 
3 To an incorporated area on the opposite side 
4 should be less than twenty-five percent of the 
5 total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated 
6 area, and that's what those calculations are. 
7 Now, could you draw other points? 
8 Absolutely. You could draw other points that 
9 would make essentially anything fail, Your Honor. 
10 It doesn't say how opposite the opposite side is. 
11 Could I draw a line from this point—excuse me, 
12 Your Honor-from this point here to this point 
13 here, and would it fail? Sure. Could I draw a 
14 line from this point here to this point here, and 
15 would it fail? Absolutely. Could I draw a line 
16 from a great number of points that would make it 
17 fail within its (inaudible)? Sure. I'm not 
18 going to pretend that that's not the case, Your 
19 Honor. Could I draw a line that passes the 
20 statute, and is it a logical answer? Absolutely. 
21 Your Honor, there is a case, Patterson 
22 v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment in a land use 
23 context, that says that land use statutes, because 
24 they are in derogation of private property rights, 
25 should be construed in favor of the land owner. 
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1 It's not technically apposite here, but it does 
2 provide guidance, and I can get the Court the 
3 citation, if you want to. 
4 THE COURT: Sure. That would be 
5 helpful. 
6 MR. BAIRD: It's Patterson v. Utah 
7 County Bd. of Adjustment. Again, it's in the 
8 land use context, but I would argue that it's 
9 here. And I would also argue, Your Honor, that 
10 you just look at it as common sense. If the 
11 Legislature has done a really bad job of writing 
12 the statute, and it's tough to read, then what 
13 you think about is-the flip side of the question 
13 
14 is, well, can anybody disconnect? 
15 If you take Mr. Garing's analysis, 
16 exhibit A, theirs, basically any way you drew 
17 these numbers would create a peninsula. So, his 
18 problem is that his definition is so over-
19 inclusive, that it precludes essentially all the 
20 disconnection. 
21 THE COURT: And also, the statute wasn't 
22 written in a vacuum. There were cases pre-dating 
23 the statute that deal with the peninsula issue. 
24 What extent should I look at those cases to see 
25 what evil the Legislature was attempting to 
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1 resolve? 
2 MR. BAIRD: And I think that's a good 
3 point, Your Honor, and I don't have the cite off 
4 the top of my head. It's in our trial brief, but 
5 the basic evil that the Legislature was trying to 
6 resolve, was trying to resolve a peninsula jutting 
7 into a city, or a peninsula that goes out and 
8 cherry picks the Cottonwood Mall, or something 
9 like that. They were trying to resolve-I can 
10 draw on one of these, because it's not a marked 
11 exhibit. 
12 Instead of jutting like this, Your 
13 Honor, if we tried to do a peninsula that went 
14 like that. Now, let's just say there was a 
15 really big sales tax generator over here, and we 
16 tried to jut into there, and it went across their 
17 road, and it meant that they would be maintaining 
18 this road on this side, and maintaining this road 
19 on this side, that's a peninsula. That's the 
20 evils that the statute is trying to deal with. 
21 If their water line went from here to here, for 
22 example. If their city hall was here, and they 
23 were cut off from that by the peninsula. Those 
24 are the kind of common sense evils that the 
25 peninsula language is talking about. 
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1 The rest of the language from the case 
2 law, Your Honor, I think that is also illustrative 
3 on this is the basic principle that it is vacant 
4 land. It is vacant land here. Where is the 
5 aerial? I mean, I don't need the aerial. We all 
6 know that it's vacant land. It doesn't jut into 
7 anything. It doesn't break up any other systems. 
8 It doesn't interfere with Bluffdale as we know it. 
9 Remember, the testimony from Mr. 
10 Barton, the guy who was here when the city was 
11 founded, was on the original founding, said that 
12 that's the boundary of Bluffdale. You can't get 
13 over it. It's a canal. There is no roads over 
14 it. 
15 The evils that peninsula was meant to 
16 stop, cherry picking, breaking up the logical flow 
17 of the boundaries and the public services, 
18 absolutely none of those evils exist here, Your 
19 Honor. 
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